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Abstract
Protecting DoD critical infrastructure resources and Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems from cyber attacks is becoming an increasingly
challenging task. DoD Information Assurance controls provide a sound framework to
achieve an appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, these
controls have not been updated since 2003 and currently do not adequately address the
security of DoD SCADA systems. This research sampled U.S. Air Force Civil
Engineering subject matter experts representing eight Major Commands that manage and
operate SCADA systems. They ranked 30 IA controls in three categories, and evaluated
eight SCADA specific IA controls for inclusion into the DoD IA control framework.
Spearman’s Rho ranking results (ρ = .972414) indicate a high preference for encryption,
and system and information integrity as key IA Controls to mitigate cyber risk. Equally
interesting was the strong agreement among raters on ranking certification and
accreditation dead last as an effective IA control. The respondents strongly favored
including four new IA controls of the eight considered.
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CODIFYING INFORMATION ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE (DOD) SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION
(SCADA) SYSTEMS

I. Introduction
The evolution of critical infrastructure has experienced an unusually rapid maturity in
the last decade due to the high influence of information technology and the Internet.
Twenty years ago, “infrastructure” was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of
the nation’s public works (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). Recent threat developments
have culminated in a series of laws, and executive orders to define infrastructure sectors
and the corresponding assets considered being to be the most “critical”. Vulnerability of
these systems to cyber interruptions (intentional or unintentional) or exploitation due to
internet connectivity has raised the level of information systems importance to critical
infrastructure.
Information systems can add value to Industrial Control System (ICS) environments.
Consequently, the number of information systems used in ICS has increased rapidly in
recent years (Guttromson & Schur, 2007). ICSs are of critical importance to our nation
as many are used to support a significant number of the national critical infrastructure.
Besides adding value, the convergence of information systems and ICSs also threaten our
nation by putting at risk our national critical infrastructure. (Throughout this thesis,
Industrial Control Systems will be referred to as Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for consistency and clarity).
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Information security specialists have to artfully balance security versus operation. It
is part of their job to allow enough flexibility for successful operations while protecting
the systems and the data therein. Security professionals agree that SCADA systems are
generally more complicated because of the convergence of increasingly dissimilar
technologies in SCADA systems and business networks. As long as corporations
continue to connect SCADA systems with business enterprise networks, the potential
risks for cyber attacks will continue to increase (Ning, 2008).
This research focused on the current Department of Defense (DoD) Information
Assurance (IA) controls published in 2003 and the current NIST ICS Security controls
published in 2008. This thesis seeks to correlate the current set of IA controls framework
to determine IA security control gaps specific to SCADA systems.
Problem Statement
Protecting our critical infrastructures from attack is a very difficult task. The
government not only considers a vast number of infrastructure critical, but the fact that up
to 85% of our critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector makes the problem
even more challenging (Martin, 2006). Understanding the importance of ICSs, associated
cyber risk, and how they are protected via IA controls is considered highly relevant for
this effort. The adoption of information technology systems in an ICS environment and
their convergence continue to increase our nation’s exposure to real and potentially
catastrophic threats (GAO, 2004).
This research seeks to reduce the gap between security IA controls issued by DoD
in 2003 and the current NIST ICS security controls published in 2008. Much has
changed since 2003. There are currently a vast number of organizations engaged in
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various research efforts focused on SCADA and ICS security. The most recent DoD IA
controls published in 2003 do not incorporate the new ICS IA controls published by
NIST in 2008. This thesis attempts to generate ICS security controls corresponding to
NIST publications and update the DoD IA controls, thus, producing a standard that can
be applied to AF ICS.
Research Goals
The overall AFIT AF A4/7 research effort is to develop efficient methodologies for
assessing AF critical infrastructures. For this phase of the effort, this thesis will review
and correlate current National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
Department of Defense (DoD) security controls, identify possible DoD Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) security gaps, recommend new or modified DoD IA controls to close these
gaps and validate security controls with subject matter experts from the AF civil
engineering community. Finally, this thesis will assess what security controls the DoD
ICS community believes are the most important.
Scope
This research is limited to mostly non-technical assessments of current
government and Department of Defense (DoD) published standards, policy or regulation
and the opinion of different subject matter experts from the AF civil engineering
community.
Thesis Organization
The goal of this section is to provide a background for this research, establish its
goals and scope and introduce the organization of this thesis. In order to discover
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security gaps in DoD Information Assurance (IA)
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security controls, one must understand the importance of ICS and information assurance.
Chapter two provides the background of Industrial Controls Systems (ICS) and their
importance to critical infrastructure. Next, SCADA and Information Systems (IS)
network convergence, cyber connectivity trends, and critical infrastructure cyber
exposures are discussed. The next section discusses the basics of protecting Information
IS in the federal government and the DoD via IA disciplines. Chapter two concludes by
bringing together IA security controls from the National Institute of Standard and
Technology (NIST) and the DoD specific to SCADA systems. Chapter three present the
methodology used in the study data collection procedures, and survey instrument, and the
data analysis procedures. Chapter four presents the results of the data analysis. Chapter
five discusses the conclusions and recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
This section covers, in very general terms, topics such as Industrial Control Systems
(called SCADA throughout this document), Critical Infrastructure Protection,
Information Assurance, Information Assurance Controls and the role different levels of
our government play in attempting to protect their information assets. Equally important
to the discussion is the importance of SCADA systems as they have become integral parts
of our critical infrastructure and how different government agencies attempt to preserve
their confidentiality, integrity and availability through the use of information assurance
programs and IA controls. This section provides a high-level view of the government’s
SCADA IA effort and ends with a brief view of DoD specific efforts.
The U.S. has seen a significant and steady increase in cyber attacks on both
traditional information technology (IT) networks and Critical Infrastructure Systems.
Some of these information systems are at the core of our national critical infrastructure;
hence greater efforts and attention are being directed towards securing these systems and
cyber security has become a priority to our nation (Langevin & McCaul, 2008).
Not only is the government taking notice, but the mainstream media is now covering
cyber security in much more detail. In the article “America’s Growing Risk: Cyber
Attack. How enemy hackers threaten our nuke plants, pipelines and more,” (Derene,
2009) discusses the possibilities of the enemy creating mass disruptions of services to
SCADA by changing a few lines of computer code (Derene, 2009). These scenarios
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become more plausible as more organizations continue to integrate SCADA and business
networks leading to an increased risk of cyber attacks.
Critical Infrastructure
The definition of critical infrastructure is constantly evolving (Lewis, 2006). The
Marsh Report (1997) and Executive Order 13010 (EO-13010, 1998) provided an early
definition of infrastructure:
“a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems that function
collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of
essential foods and service” (Lewis, 2006).
The most current definition can be found in Homeland Security Presidential Directive
7, issued by President Bush in 2003:
“Critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that
underpin American society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose
exploitation or destruction by terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass
casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could
profoundly affect our national prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical
infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through
terrorist attack, could have a debilitating effect on security and economic well-being”
(Moteff &Parfomak, 2004).
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Table 1. Critical infrastructure sectors (Brown et al., 2006)
Critical infrastructure sectors
Information Technology
Telecommunications

Public health, healthcare and food
- Drinking water and water treatment

Chemical

Energy

Transportation Systems

Banking and finance

Emergency Services

National monuments and icons

Postal and Shipping services

Defense industrial base

Agriculture

Critical infrastructure is divided into 14 sectors, the sectors are provided in Table 1.
These infrastructures have grown complex and interconnected, meaning that a disruption
in one may lead to disruptions in others (Mosfett, 2008). Over the years, operators of
these infrastructures have taken measures to guard against, and to quickly respond to,
many of the intentional and unintentional threats (Mosfett, 2008). However, the
protection of these sectors requires government agencies and the private sector to work in
concert to try to find the best solutions for protecting our critical infrastructures. To best
coordinate efforts and resources, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 selected
eight agencies for each of the sectors. Table 2 provides a list of lead agencies and their
corresponding responsibility for critical infrastructure.
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Table 2. Critical Infrastructure Lead Agencies (Moteff &Parfomak, 2004)
Lead Agency
Dept. of Homeland Security

Dept. of Agriculture
Dept. of Health and Human
Services
Environmental Protection
Agency
Dept. of Energy

Dept. of the Treasury
Dept. of the Interior
Dept. of Defense

Critical Infrastructure
Information technology
Telecommunications
Chemical
Transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation,
maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems
Emergency services
Postal and shipping services
Agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products)
Public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat,
poultry, egg products)
Drinking water and waste water treatment systems
Energy, including the production refining, storage, and
distribution of oil and gas, and electric power (except for
commercial nuclear power facilities)
Banking and finance
National monuments and icons
Defense industrial base

Industrial Control Systems support a great number of our critical national
infrastructures such as power generation, gas and oil pipelines, water and waste, etc. The
number of information systems in critical infrastructures has increased rapidly in recent
years (Guttromson & Schur, 2007). Information systems expansion and adoption by
critical infrastructure operators can threaten our nation by putting our national critical
infrastructure at risk.
Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
In this thesis, the terms Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA), and Critical Infrastructure are generally used
interchangeably to refer to the same systems. This thesis uses SCADA as a general term
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encompassing several types of controls systems including ICS, distribute control systems
(DCS), and critical infrastructure systems.
SCADA systems are considered a specialized information system. However, unlike a
“regular” information system, SCADA systems have been primarily designed with safety,
availability, and reliability in mind. SCADA systems are a type of computer automation
system that uses a central computer system, wide area communications technologies and
a large number of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), to monitor and control geographically
distributed processes such as pipelines, electric power transmission, and waste water
(Shaw, 2006).
Because SCADA systems are based on computer technology, their designs have
evolved in step with advances in computer technology which means that as computer
technology has developed, the designers of SCADA systems have incorporated these
advances into these systems (Shaw, 2006). In addition, SCADA systems can be viewed
as a system of systems where individual components contribute to the overall availability,
integrity, and confidentiality of the entire system. The loss of a single component can
bring down the entire system. This philosophy is embraced by the popular saying: “A
system is only as strong as its weakest link.”
A SCADA system is basically used to fetch and present current data values to human
operators typically located at a control center (Shaw, 2006). The control centers are
usually located in a separate physical part of the factory and typically have advanced
computation and communication facilities. Modern control centers have data servers,
human-machine interface (HMI) stations, data historians, engineering workstations, and
other servers to aid the operators in the overall management of the SCADA system (see
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Figure 1). Control centers provides situational awareness of the systems and operations,
dispatch repair crews when needed, and serve as the focal point during emergencies
(Igure, 2008).

Figure 1. Typical Components of Industrial Control Systems (GAO, 2004)
SCADA networks are usually connected to the outside corporate network and/or the
internet through specialized gateways (Igure, 2008). A SCADA network provides
various connections for field devices or remote field sites via telephone, radio frequency
(RF), satellite or wide area networks (see Figure 2.). These field devices, such as sensors
and actuators, are monitored and controlled over the SCADA network at the control
center. Communications on a SCADA network include control messages exchanged
between master and slave devices. A master device is one which can control the
operation of another device (i.e. PC, PLC). A slave device is usually a simple sensor or
actuator which can send messages to the command device and carry out actions at the
command of a master device (Igure, 2008).
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Figure 2. SCADA Control Center (Stouffer, 2005)
Many of these systems perform critical functions. In the electric industry for
example, many of these systems perform critical bulk electric systems functions such as
telemetry, monitoring and control, power plant control and real-time inter-utility data
exchange. The loss or compromise of these systems would adversely impact the reliable
operation of electric system assets, affecting part of our nation’s critical infrastructure
(Shaw, 2006).

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
There has been a variety of working groups, special reports, federal policies, and
organizations addressing CIP issues (see Appendix A for evolution of CIP) (GAO, 2004).
In recent years, the security community has grown more concerned about the physical
and cyber vulnerability of critical infrastructures (Moteff, 2008). We know with certainty
that in order to protect our national critical infrastructure against possible attacks, security
specialists have to properly guard against physical and cyber threats alike.
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The government’s goal for CIP is to ensure that any disruptions of the services
provided by critical infrastructures are infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable
(Moteff, 2008). CIP tries to counter and mitigate existing critical infrastructures threats.
The official definition of CIP as defined in Presidential Directive 7 is: “the strategies,
policies and preparedness needed to protect, prevent, and when necessary, respond to
attacks on critical sectors and key assets” (Lewis, 2006).
Because about 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by the
private sector, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to protect these
assets. To this effect, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
coordinating a national protection strategy including formation of government and private
sector councils as a collaborating tool. The councils are to identify their most critical
assets, assess the risks they face, and identify protective measures in sector-specific plans
that comply with DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (GAO, 2006).
In a press release (Nov 2009), Secretary Napolitano reaffirmed the government
commitment to protecting our critical infrastructures:
“Securing our nation’s critical infrastructure is vital to maintaining the safety of
communities across the country; DHS is committed to working with federal, state, local,
territorial and tribal partners, the private sector and the public to protect against threats to
these assets—from cyber networks to drinking water.”
Many of these critical infrastructure sectors have developed their own security
practices and procedures. Many of these practices and procedures are applicable across
industry boundaries to include the federal government. NIST has been working with a
vast number of organizations to collect and codify this information to develop security
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control standards that can be tailored and applied across sectors. This unified security
framework is crucial to protect our critical infrastructures, especially in the cyberspace
domain.
Critical Infrastructure and Cyberspace
Globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure
underpins almost every facet of modern society and provides critical support for the U.S.
economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security (Hathaway, 2009).
Most modern industrial facilities (e.g. oil refineries, chemical factories, electrical power
generation, and manufacturing) and associated critical infrastructures are largely
dependent on these digital information and communications infrastructure.
The new Cyberspace Policy Review (2009) defines cyberspace as “… the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual
environment of information and interactions between people.”
Operators rely heavily on cyberspace to monitor and control industrial systems.
Because these networks are connected to the business network and the internet, operators
are able to remote command and control these systems (Igure, 2008). This connectivity
can help optimize manufacturing and distribution processes. It can also increase
efficiency and reduce costs, but it also exposes the safety-critical industrial network to the
myriad security problems of the internet (Igure, 2008).
Historically, security concerns were about protecting the physical nodes against
physical attack, not protecting SCADA systems in cyberspace. This is no longer the
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case; it has become evident that critical infrastructures are also vulnerable to cyber
attacks (Dancey, 2004). Several factors have contributed to the higher number of cyber
threats to these systems: (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with known
vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other networks, (3) insecure
remote connections, and (4) the widespread availability of technical information about
control systems (Dancey, 2004).
Since 2001, 70% of reported incidents were due to attacks originating from outside
the SCADA network (Igure, 2008). In a recent report published by the security company
McAffe (2010), six hundred IT and security executives from critical infrastructure
enterprises across seven sectors in 14 countries were surveyed. Topics of the survey
included: their practices, attitudes and policies on security, the impact of regulation, their
relationship with government, specific security measures employed on their networks,
and the kinds of attacks they face (Baker et al., 2010). According to Baker et al (2010),
the survey was not designed to be statistically valid. However, it provides a snapshot of
views from a significant group of decision-makers. Additionally, the survey described in
detail the way critical IT networks are defended and secured today.
Some of the more significant details provided in the report are:
•
•
•
•
•

China reported the highest adoption rate of security measures
Sectors with lowest adoption rate of security measures are water and sewage
Sectors with highest adoption rate of security measures are energy and
banking
Foreign governments involvement in recent critical infrastructure attacks is
high
US and China are seen as “most potential” aggressors to critical infrastructure
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Figure 3. Time Base Expectancy of a Cyber Attack (Baker et al., 2010)
Countries expect critical infrastructure attacks in the near future. Figure 3 provides a
bar graph illustrating which countries expect a critical infrastructure attack. These
attacks are often leveraged by highly skilled operators and sponsored by foreign nations
(Baker et al., 2010). The impact can vary depending on the severity of the attack and/or
the facility targeted. Attacks can cost millions of dollars in lost revenues and damaged
reputation. Survey participants also believe that attackers will become more skilled and
resourceful (Baker et al., 2010).
The same sentiment was echoed by Mr. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National
Intelligence during his 2010 annual threat assessment brief to Congress while speaking
on the subject of cyber threats:
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“The national security of the United States, our economic prosperity, and the
daily functioning of our government are dependent on a dynamic public and
private information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer
networks and systems, and the information residing within. This critical
infrastructure is severely threatened…The United States confronts a dangerous
combination of known and unknown vulnerabilities, strong and rapidly expanding
adversary capabilities, and a lack of comprehensive threat awareness. Malicious
cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary
sophistication.”

Information Assurance (IA)
What is information assurance? It is about protecting information from destruction,
degradation, manipulation and exploitation (Blyth and Kovacich, 2006). Information
assurance has many different meanings to many different people but a widely used
definition for IA in the private sector is:
“ IA defines and applies a collection of policies, standards, methodologies, services
and mechanisms to maintain mission integrity with respect to people, process,
technology, information and supporting infrastructure” (Willett, 2008).
Information has become a critical asset and a high value target for many competing
interests. Therefore, information and information systems need to be protected and
secured from unauthorized access, changes or disruptions. Information assurance
provides a mean for an organization to protect their information and information systems.
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As society increasingly relies on information systems, an effective IA program must
be implemented that addresses technology, processes, and people. A failure of any one
of these elements can adversely impact the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of
systems and the information within. An effective IA program becomes more crucial as
cyber attackers continue to improve their technical competencies, tactics, and techniques.

The DoD defines IA as:
“Actions taken that protect and defend information and information systems by
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation.
This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection and reaction capabilities”(DoDD 8500.1, 2002).
IA and the US Government
Technology advancements have improved many aspects of our lives but they have
also given rise to various new problems (Senft and Gallegos, 2008). The government is
coping with these new problems by trying to update laws, policy and regulations.
Unfortunately, they generally lag behind new technological changes. Even when
governments assume the role of defender, seeking to prevent attacks and improve
security, many IT and security executives are skeptical about their ability to deter or
protect against cyber attacks. Figure 4 compares the percentage of countries that believe
their current laws are inadequate against cyber attackers.
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Figure 4. Laws Inadequate Against Cyber Attacks (Baker et al., 2010)
Reaction to serious events can be a great catalyst for quick government action. For
example, major data breaches caused by hackers and stolen or lost laptops resulted in
huge outcries by citizens prompting the government to enact new laws, policies and
guidance (refer to Appendix C for a more comprehensive breakdown of some of these
documents). For this research effort, the focus is directed toward documents related to
the development of IA programs and security controls such as Appendix III to Office of
Management and Budget Circular Number A-130 (OMB Circular No. A-130), and the
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).
OMB Circular No. A-130 in many ways engendered the need to establish and employ
IA controls commensurate to information risk and affirmed the need to accredit and
certify federal systems at least every three years (OMB, 2000). Appendix III re-orients
the federal computer security program to better respond to a rapidly changing
technological environment. It establishes government wide responsibilities for federal
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computer security and requires federal agencies to adopt a minimum set of management
controls.
These management controls are directed at individual information technology users.
Agencies are required to implement and maintain a program to assure that adequate
security is provided for all agency information collected, processed, transmitted, stored,
or disseminated in general support systems and major applications (OMB, 2000). In
addition, agencies need to review the security controls in each system when significant
modifications are made to the system, but at least every three years. The scope and
frequency of the review should be commensurate with the acceptable level of risk for the
system (OMB, 2000).
FISMA is the principal law governing the federal government’s information security
program. It requires federal government agencies to provide information security
protections for agency information and information systems (Hulitt and Vaughn Jr,
2008). FISMA defined three security objectives for federal government information
systems: (1) confidentiality, to preserve authorized restrictions on access and disclosure,
with means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; (2) integrity, to
guard against improper information modification or destruction while ensuring
information non-repudiation and authenticity; and (3) availability, to ensure timely and
reliable access and use of information. FISMA places significant requirements on federal
agencies for the protection of information and information systems, and places significant
requirements on the NIST to assist the federal agencies comply with FISMA (Ross et al.,
2005).
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FISMA required NIST to develop two mandatory Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) that apply to all federal information and information systems to include
SCADA systems. However, these FIPS are not mandatory for the national security
community and private sector. These standards are FIPS 199 and FIPS 200. FIPS 199 is
a standard used for determining the security category of an information system. FIPS
200 is a standard stating the mandatory minimum security requirements that all federal
information systems must meet (Katzke, Stouffer et al., 2006).
IA and the DoD
DoD policy mandates IA to be implemented in all systems and services acquisitions
at levels appropriate to the system characteristics and requirements throughout the entire
system life cycle (DoDI 8580.1, 2004). One of the key processes for implementing
information assurance is the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process.
DoDD 8500.1 requires that all DoD information systems be certified and accredited.
Certification is defined as: “The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and nontechnical security features of an IT system and other safeguards, made in support of the
accreditation process, to establish the extent that a particular design and implementation
meets a set of specified security requirements” (Lee et al., 2005).
Accreditation on the other hand is “The formal declaration by the Designated
Approving Authority (DAA) that an IT system is approved to operate in a particular
security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable level of risk” (Lee,
S., G. Ahn, et al., 2005). The DAA is “The official with the authority to formally assume
the responsibility for operating a system or network at an acceptable level of risk” (Lee
et al., 2005).
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The DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process
(DITSCAP) was one of the first processes to certify and accredit DoD systems. The
DITSCAP Application Manual defines the DITSCAP as “the standard DoD process for
identifying information security requirements, providing security solutions, and
managing information systems security activities” (Lee et al., 2005). In 2006, the
DITSCAP was superseded by the DoD Information Assurance Certification and
Accreditation Process (DIACAP). DIACAP officially establishes DoD’s IA C&A
process for authorizing the operation of DoD information systems. DIACAP is the DoD’s
approach to implementing a C&A process that supports Net-Centricity (Tyler, 2006).
The DoD anticipates that almost everything will eventually interconnect making the
standardization of protection levels for systems very important. This implies that there
should be a standard for determining a protection level to enable uniformity across
interconnections (Campbell, 2007). Table 2 provides a variety of C & A guiding
documents for federal organizations.
Table 3. C& A Guiding Documents (Campbell, 2007)
Federal Entity
DoD

Guiding Document
DIACAP, DoDD 8500.1, DoDI 8500.2 &
DoDI 8510.01

Intelligence

DCID 6/3

Other Federal Agencies

OMB A-130, NIST SP 800-37, NIST SP 80053, NIST SP 800-60

The DIACAP implements and validates standardized IA controls across DoD
information systems consistent with DoD regulatory policy (i.e. IA 8500 series) and
legislative policy (i.e. FISMA) (Bendel, 2006). In addition, DIACAP is based on two
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principles: (1) IA is established via IA controls
controls, and
nd (2) IA controls need to be
maintained.
The concepts of DoD IA controls were introduced in 2002 by DoDD 8500.1 and
DoDI 8500.2. An IA control
ontrol describes what the relevant safeguards and activities should
provide (Campbell, 2007).. All DoD information systems have to maintain an appropriate
level of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability, and non-repudiation.
repudiation.

Figure 5. IS IA Categories (from Auburn.edu)
Due to the sheer number of systems and to make the program more manageable for
IA professionals, DoD information systems are organized into the four categories:
categories
Automated Information System
ystem (AIS) applications, enclaves, outsourced IT--based
processes, and platform IT (DoD
DoDI 8500.2, 2003). Figure 5 offers a logical representation
of the four categories. Appendix D contains definitions for each of these categories.
categories
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Due to the “joint” nature of military operations and to continue to move towards
DoD’s net-centricity vision, the DoD has decided that a service C&A should be honored
when connecting to a different service’s network via a reciprocity agreement. DoD
Memorandum (2009), DoD Information System Certification and Accreditation
Reciprocity, “mandates the mutual agreement among participating enterprises to accept
each other’s security assessment in order to reuse IS resources and /or accept each
other’s assessed security posture in order to share information.”
IA and ICS
Many SCADA systems in use today entered the workforce years ago, when security
measures were not anticipated; system reliability and safety were primarily the focus.
Securing SCADA systems simply meant: physically secure access to the network and the
devices that controlled these systems (Katzke et al., 2006). The introduction of new
information technologies makes it possible to connect vastly different networks -- to
include the once isolated SCADA networks. SCADA networks are now able to connect
to traditional business networks over the same information infrastructure.
A common misconception regarding SCADA networks is that they are isolated from
outside networks (Igure, 2008). However, according to the McAffe report (2010), “more
than three quarters of those with responsibilities for ICS reported that they were
connected to the Internet or some other IP network, and just under half of those
connected admitted that this created an “unresolved security issue.” Business networks
are perhaps better equipped to handle insecurities and have security tools designed to
counter and mitigate threats, but many ICS components are unprepared to handle most
common threats and malware (Wiles et al., 2008).
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Neglecting or bypassing security measures can create a vast number of vulnerabilities
Figure 6 illustrate the security measures adoption rates by country. Security
vulnerabilities can also arise in a system because of problems in the system specification,
the system implementation or during system operation (Igure, 2008). Attackers take
advantage of these vulnerabilities to affect the integrity, availability, and confidentiality
of these systems. Table 3 describes the most common general threats and effects of
several of these attacks.

Figure 6. Security measures adoption rates (Baker et al., 2010)
The connectivity of SCADA networks with outside networks will continue to grow,
leading to an increased risk of cyber attacks and a critical need to improve the security of
SCADA networks (Igure, 2008). Many professional organizations are involved in the
effort to improve SCADA network security (Igure, 2008). Many industry sectors have
developed their own security standards, for example: the electric industry uses North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) standards, the gas industry uses the
American Gas Association (AGA) standards.
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Table 4. General threats and attack effects (Igure, 2008)
General Threat
Modifying system/user data
Alter/Destroy stored data
Modify message content
Change control signals
Change data points/set points
Change operator display value
Sniffing data/control messages
Block/reroute communications
Shut down devices
Plan malicious code

Effect of Attack
Loss of data integrity; Secondary effects could be loss of
availability
Loss of data
Loss of data/message integrity; Secondary effects could be
loss of availability; Presenting wrong information to
human operators could have adverse effects
Loss of confidentiality
Loss of availability
Loss of availability
Could cause all kinds of disruptions depending on intent
of attack

US Government and ICS IA
The major US government SCADA security objectives are: (1) restrict logical access
to the SCADA network, (2) restrict physical access to the SCADA network and devices,
(3) protect individual SCADA components from exploitation, (4) maintain functionality
during adverse conditions, and (5) restoring systems after an incident (SP 800-82, 2008).
The government believes that the most successful methods for securing a SCADA system
is to gather industry recommended practices and engage in a proactive, collaborative
effort between all stake holders (SP 800-53, 2009).
As previously mentioned, FISMA required NIST to develop two mandatory Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS). To support both FIPS 199 and FIPS 200,
NIST developed Special Publication (SP) 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for
Federal Information Systems.” SP 800-53 requires federal agencies to implement one of
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three minimum (baseline) sets of security controls for all information system in the
agency based on the systems’ security categorization (2006).
It is important to point out that SP 800-53 was first developed to address traditional
IT systems, not SCADA systems. In time, SP 800-53 has adopted security controls
specific to ICS. NIST has worked cooperatively with the SCADA communities in the
public and private sectors to develop specific guidance to apply the security controls
SCADA systems. SCADA-specific guidance is included in NIST SP 800-53, Revision 3,
Appendix I: Industrial Control Systems – Security Controls, Enhancements, and
Supplemental Guidance (Stouffer et al., 2008).
If automated mechanisms are not readily available, cost-effective or technically
feasible, then compensating security controls implemented through non-automated
mechanisms or procedures should be employed (SP 800-53, 2009). Compensating
controls are alternative safeguards and countermeasures that accomplish the intent of the
original security controls that could not be effectively employed (SP 800-53, 2009).
In 2006, NIST released the Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) and Industrial Control System Security (SP 800-82) to addresses
vulnerabilities, threats, and security controls (Katzke et al., 2006). Section 6 of the
document provides initial guidance on how 800-53 security controls apply to ICS’s. See
Appendix D for a list of ICS specific controls (Stouffer et al., 2008). Following the NIST
guidelines is mandatory for federal agencies; however, it is voluntary for
nongovernmental organizations and private agencies.
NIST SP 800-82 provides an overview of ICS’s system topologies, identifies threats
and vulnerabilities to an ICS, and provides recommended security countermeasures to
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mitigate the associated risks. Specific recommendations and guidance are provided in an
outlined box for each section throughout the document. In addition, Appendix C provides
an overview of the many activities currently ongoing among federal organizations,
standards organizations, industry groups, and automation system vendors to make
available “best practices” in the area of ICS security (Stouffer et al., 2008).
Organizations are encouraged to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to
meet their specific security and business requirements (Stouffer et al., 2008). A single
security solution is not adequate to properly protect ICS’s. An effective cyber security
strategy should apply a defense-in-depth approach. A combination of policy and security
controls can be very effective. The publication provides three types of security controls:
management, operational and technical (Stouffer et al., 2008).
NIST IA Controls
NIST security controls are derived from multiple communities (defense, financial,
healthcare, and intelligence) and are applicable to any organization (SP800-53, 2009).
The selection and implementation of appropriate security controls for information
systems are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations and assets
of an organization (SP800-53, 2009). To successfully implement security controls,
organizations must (1) select a security control baseline, (2) tailor the baseline security
controls, and (3) supplement the tailored baseline as necessary.
Table 4 provides a listing of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls. They are grouped
into three classes (1) management, (2) operational, and (3) technical controls. Security
controls should be employed in conjunction with and as part of a well-defined and
documented information security program (SP800-53, 2009).
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Table 5. SP 800-53 Security Control (SP800-53, 2009)
ID

FAMILY

AC

Access Control

AT

Awareness and Training

Operational

AU

Audit and Accountability

Technical

CA

Security Assessments and Authorization

CLASS
Technical

Management

CM

Configuration Management

Operational

CP

Contingency Planning

Operational

IA

Identification and Authentication

IR

Incident Response

Operational

MA

Maintenance

Operational

MP

Media Protection

Operational

PE

Physical and Environmental Protection

Operational

PL

Planning

Management

PS

Personnel Security

Operational

RA

Risk Assessment

Management

SA

System and Services Acquisition

Management

SC

System and Communications Protection

SI

System and Information Integrity

Operational

PM

Program Management

Management

Technical

Technical

Management controls are controls that focus on the management of risk and the
management of the organization systems (Stouffer, 2005). Operational controls are
security controls primarily implemented and executed by personnel as opposed to the
system (Stouffer, 2005). Technical controls are security controls primarily implemented
and executed by the organization through mechanisms contained in the hardware,
software or firmware components of the system (Stouffer, 2005).
To identify each security control, a numeric identifier is appended to the family
identifier to indicate the number of the control within the family. For example, AU-5 is
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the fifth control in the Audit and Accountability family. The security control structure
consists of the following components: (1) a control section, (2) a supplemental guidance
section, (3) a control enhancements section, (4) a references section, and (v) a priority
and baseline allocation section. The following is an example of a control from the
Personnel Security family, control number 2 taken from SP 800-53, Appendix F:
PS-2

POSITION CATEGORY
Control: The organization:
a.

Assigns a risk designation to all positions

b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions
c. Reviews and revises position risk designations [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]
Supplemental Guidance: Position risk designations are consistent with
Office of Personnel Management policy and guidance. The screening
criteria includes an explicit information security role and appointment
requirements (e.g., training, security clearance).
Control Enhancements: None.
References: 5 CFR 731.106(a).
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

LOW PS-2

MOD PS-2
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HIGH PS-2

SECURITY CONTROL SECTIONS
Control section: The control section provides a concise statement of the
specific security capabilities needed to protect a particular aspect the
information system.
Supplemental section: The supplemental guidance provides important
considerations for implementing security controls in the context of an
organization’s operational environment, mission requirements, or assessment
of risk. Security control enhancements may also contain supplemental
guidance.
Security control enhancements: The control enhancements are used in an
information system requiring greater protection due to the potential impact of
loss or when organizations seek additions to the basic control functionality
based on the results of a risk assessment.
References section: The references section includes a list of applicable federal
laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, and guidelines that are
relevant to a particular security control or control enhancement.
Priority and baseline allocation: The priority and baseline allocation section
provides: (1) the recommended priority codes used for sequencing decisions
during security control implementation, and (2) the initial allocation of
security controls and control enhancements for low-impact, moderate-impact,
and high-impact information systems.
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DoD and ICS IA
The DoD relies on SCADA systems that control critical infrastructure processes
maintained by both the defense sector and private industry to support its mission and
operations. To help find IA solutions for SCADA systems, the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Science & Technology encouraged the Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) program to sponsor research focused on information assurance of
SCADA systems (OSD, 2009). For example, proposal OSD09-T003, is asking for the
development of innovative software and data protection technology that improves the
security of SCADA and Distributed Control Systems (DCS).
DoD working groups are coordinating efforts to transition DoDI 8500.2 IA controls
to those contained in the NIST 800-53 (DIACAP, 2010). This indicates that the DoD
ICS C&A guidance will be revised in the future. However, the DoD currently has no
specific C&A guidance for SCADA systems. ICS are considered a subset of platform IT
(PIT) systems. These systems physically interact with the environment and only perform
information processing assigned to it by its hosting special purpose system (ETL 9-11,
2009). Normally, C&A is not required for PIT. However, security requirements must be
addressed in system design and operation as prescribed in current guidance and policy. If
the PIT has connectivity to an external network then the C&A process is required as a
PIT Interconnection (PITI) (ETL 9-11, 2009).
The C&A process for PITI is mandatory regardless of the persistence of the boundary
interconnection (e.g., always-connected Ethernet, wireless connection, dial-up
connection). PITI refers to network access to PIT and has readily identifiable security
considerations and needs that must be addressed in both acquisition and operations (ETL
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9-11, 2009). IA controls listed in Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (DoDI
8500.2), and draft, Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security (NIST SP 800-82), are
designed to complement each other when addressing the uniqueness of PIT or PITI (ETL
9-11, 2009).
DoD IA Controls
IA controls establish baseline levels of availability, integrity and confidentiality of
any given system depending on the mission assurance category (MAC) and
confidentiality needs. Due to limited resources and vast competing interests, DoD
information systems have to be categorized in importance or mission impact levels,
particularly the combat mission. The MAC level reflects the importance of information
relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives. The DoD has defined three
MAC levels and are listed and defined in Table 5. MAC I requires the highest level of
integrity and availability, whereas MAC III requires the lowest.
Table 6. Mission Assurance Categories (DoDI 8500.2)
Mission Assurance Category
(MAC) Levels:
I

II

III

Data Mission Impact
Data is vital to the mission. The consequences of loss of
integrity or availability of a MAC I system are unacceptable.
Mission Assurance Category I systems require the most
stringent protection measures (DoDI 8500.2 para E2.1.38.1).
Data is important to the mission. The consequences of loss
of integrity are unacceptable. Loss of availability is difficult
to deal with and can only be tolerated for a short time.
Mission Assurance Category II systems require additional
safeguards beyond best practices to ensure assurance (DoDI
8500.2 para E2.1.38.2).
Data is necessary for the conduct of day-to-day business, but
does not materially affect the mission. The consequences of
loss of integrity or availability can be tolerated or overcome
without significant impacts on mission. Mission Assurance
Category III systems require protective measures,
techniques, or procedures generally commensurate with
commercial best practices (DoDI 8500.2 para E2.1.38.3).
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The baseline set of IA controls are pre-defined based on determination of the MAC
and Confidentiality Levels (CL) as required by the information system owner. The
baseline IA Controls for each of the combinations of MAC and CL are outlined in the
enclosures to DoDI 8500.2 (AFI 33-200, 2008). Confidentiality levels are primarily used to

establish acceptable access factors, such as requirements for individual security
clearances or background investigations, access approvals, and need-to-know
determinations, interconnection controls and approvals, and acceptable methods by which
users may access the system (e.g., intranet, internet, wireless) (DoDI 8580.1, 2004). The
DoD has defined three confidentiality levels. Table 6 list the definition of each
confidentiality level.
Table 7 Confidentiality Levels (DoDI 8580.1, 2004)
Confidentiality
Level
Classified

Definition
Systems process classified information

Sensitive

Systems process sensitive information to include any unclassified
information not cleared for public release

Public

Systems process publicly releasable information

There are four parts to each IA Control:
1. Subject Area: One of eight groups indicating the major subject or
focus area.
2. Control Number: Unique identifier comprised of four letters, a dash,
and a number. The first two letters are an abbreviation of the subject
area, the second two letters are an abbreviation of control name and
the number represents a level of robustness.
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3. Control Name: A brief phrase describing the individual IA control
4. Control Text: Description of IA condition or state that the IA control
is intended to achieve.
Table 8. DoD IA Control Subject Areas (DoDD 8500.2)
Abbreviation
DC
IA
EC
EB
PE
PR
CO
VI

Subject Area Name
Security Design & Configuration
Identification and Authentication
Enclave and Computing
Environment
Enclave Boundary Defense
Physical and Environmental
Personnel
Continuity
Vulnerability and Incident
Management

Number of Controls in
Subject Area
31
9
48
8
27
7
24
3
Total = 157

Table 8 provides a listing of the DoDD IA subject areas and abbreviations.
Figure 7 illustrates an example of the IA control taxonomy. Table 9 provides an example
for data at rest of an IA control with varying levels of robustness. ECCR-1 calls for
NIST certified cryptography while ECCR-3 calls for more stringent NSA-approved
cryptography. The higher the control level number, the highest the level of robustness.

Figure 7. DoD IA Control Taxonomy (DoDD 8500.2)
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The DAA or DoD community of interest representatives may add additional IA
controls to locally augment the security baseline control set, only if the augmented
controls will increase the security established by the enterprise baseline IA controls
(DIACAP, 2010). There are security guides designed to help implement IA controls such
as the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIG).
Table 9. IA Control Example
IA
Control

Control
Level

MAC

Subject Area

Control Name

ECCR-1

1

II

Enclave
Encryption for
Computing
Confidentiality
Environment (Data at Rest)

ECCR-2

2

II

Enclave
Encryption for
Computing
Confidentiality
Environment (Data at Rest)

ECCR-3

3

II

Enclave
Encryption for
Computing
Confidentiality
Environment (Data at Rest)
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Definition

If required by the information
owner, NIST-certified
cryptography is used to
encrypt stored sensitive
information.
If required by the information
owner, NIST-certified
cryptography is used to
encrypt stored classified nonSAMI information.
If a classified enclave contains
SAMI and is accessed by
individuals lacking an
appropriate clearance for
SAMI, then NSA-approved
cryptography is used to
encrypt all SAMI stored
within the enclave.

III. Methodology
Overview
This chapter presents the research methodology and statistical procedures used during
this research effort. This chapter will present the survey instrument design, the data
collection method, the sample selection criteria, and the statistical procedures used to
analyze the data gathered.
Mapping DoD and NIST IA Controls
Comparing and mapping IA controls from the NIST SP 800-82 to the DoD IA
Control framework is the primary focus of this research endeavor. A comprehensive list
of ICS IA controls were carefully scrutinized for clarity in definition, applicability to
DoD control systems, and persistent semantic translation. A numbered coding schema
was constructed to map the linkages between IA control items. An example of the coding
schema and associated definitions are provided in Table 10. The final coding schema and
associated mappings are provided in Appendix F.
Table 10. Correlation Codes
Code
8
9
11
17

Definition
NIST requirement and DoD IA control are equivalent
NIST requirement is more specific than the DoD IA control
NIST requirement has no counterpart in the DoD IA control
NIST requirement is less specific than the DoD IA control

Comparing security controls produced by different organizations is difficult and
subject to interpretation (Katzke et. al, 2006). While the mapping discussed in this thesis
represents a significant effort by a number of experts, there are no guarantees that the
mapping is completely accurate or correct (Katzke et. al, 2006). Controls were compared
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using semantic analysis to preserve the definition, intent and meaning of the IA control.
IA controls that deviated from these areas were deferred to the survey instrument for
subject matter experts resolution.
If substantial agreement can be achieved among the civil engineering SME
community, then the recommended definition can be a potential IA control candidate.
This procedure is consistent with other similar efforts and is considered adequate to make
comparisons and draw some conclusions (Katzke et. al, 2006). Although the granularity
and level of abstraction of the security control sets being compared are not always the
same, using a SME consensus approach preserves precision of definition and minimizes
differences in interpretation and judgment (Abrams, 2007).
Survey Instrument
The survey instrument is divided into three sections. Section one contains five
questions related to demographic information of the participants, section two contains a
listing of control area categories in a table format for ease of creating rankings, and
section three contains eight recommended IA security controls for evaluation by
participants using a 5-point Likert scale. The survey instrument design combines
recommended best practices from a variety of sources to derive a specific set of IA
controls that can be incorporated into the DoD IA control framework. Many ICS or
SCADA IA controls map to the DoD framework with no translation required. However,
other IA controls were so specific to ICS or SCADA that some interpretation or
translation is required. The survey contains the set of ICS or SCADA IA controls that
require:
(1) translation to fit into an “existing” DoD IA control subject category
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or
(2) interpretation to fit into a “newly created” DoD IA control subject category
SME participants were asked to rank NIST ICS IA control categories in what they
perceive is most important to day-to-day operations. Additionally, subjects were asked to
rate the measurement of agreement on proposed modifications to existing DoD IA
controls and the addition of new DoD IA controls. This survey should provide feedback
about the security controls the DoD ICS community feels are most important to secure
ICSs. Additionally, the survey should help gauge if those priorities are being met by the
current DoD IA controls.
Pilot Survey
The survey instrument was pilot tested by with two groups of personnel. One group
had little IA control exposure and focused on testing the functionality, layout, and the
clarity of instruction of the survey instrument. The second group had varying degrees of
exposure to IA controls and tested the items, definitions, and reasonableness of the
survey instrument. The pilot survey personnel consisted of graduate students attending
the Air Force Institute of Technology. Their feedback resulted in changes to various
questions, rewording instructions, and changing various elements of the layout design to
improve readability.
Population
The target population is USAF Industrial Control Systems subject matter experts
(SMEs) from the civil engineering community. The sample was drawn from personnel
stationed at various bases located with the Continental United States (CONUS) and
Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) representing as many major
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commands as possible. The personnel included in the sample were specifically targeted
because they met the following criteria:
•

They represent a good cross section of the USAF population of Civil Engineer

subject matter experts
•

They have been exposed to management principles for securing control systems

from cyber threats through industry certification or other formally recognized education
•

They have a vested interest in getting this right for the USAF and the DoD

community
•

They volunteered to participate in the study
Sampling Strategy
The sampling procedure used for this research was convenience sampling. A

convenience sample is a procedure where the subjects are selected, in part or in whole, at
the convenience of the researcher. This approach is a specific type of non-probability
sampling which involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population which
is readily available. In this case, the desired sample should consist of a good cross
section of U.S. Air Force personnel from the civil engineering community. Furthermore,
it is desired to achieve a good cross sectional representation of U.S. Air Force major
commands.
Research Approval
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Institutional Review Board (IRB)
reviewed and approved the study and survey instrument for this research. Additionally,
this study qualified for an IRB exemption because it contains research activities in which
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the only involvement of human subjects was covered by an exemption category.
Appendix I contains the AFIT IRB waiver approval.
Additionally, in accordance with Air Force Instruction 36-2601, all surveys
administered to U.S. Air Force personnel must first be approved and assigned a survey
control number by the Air Force Survey Branch (AFSB) at the Air Force Personnel
Center (AFPC). An acceptable alternative to AFSB approval is to obtain a commanders
approval to conduct the survey of U.S. Air Force personnel. Permission to survey U.S.
Air Force civil engineering personnel was authorized by the Air Force Civil Engineering
Support Agency (AFCESA). Appendix G contains the AFCESA approval memorandum.
Data Collection Method
The survey instrument was electronically distributed to the respondents via electronic
mail (email) as an attached document. All participants were asked to respond with a
digitally signed email as a measure of validating the identity and authenticity of the
respondent in an online environment. This procedure is feasible because the participants
are expected to use a DoD Common Access Card (CAC) to access email services. As an
additional measure to preserve anonymity, the participant email address was inserted into
the blind carbon copy field. This technique is a reasonable measure to preserve the
secrecy of the intended recipient in email communications. Responses were stored on a
network server in a password protected folder at the Air Force Institute of Technology.
The survey instrument is provided in appendix H.
Data Analysis Procedures
The data analysis phase of this study focused on (1) describing the perceived
importance of NIST ICS security controls to the day-to-day operation of DoD ICS
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controls and (2) the level of agreement among SMEs to recommended new and modified
DoD IA controls specific to ICS. Part one consists of matched pairs of rankings that
measure the strength of the association and perceived importance of Security Control
Area categories among US Air Force civil engineering SMEs. Part two, consists of eight
recommended ICS security controls that address gaps in the current DoD IA controls
framework. The next section will describe the procedures for both parts.
Part I: Paired Rankings
Respondents were randomly assigned into one of two groups. Ranked responses were
rank ordered from 1 through k items for each group. Ties were resolved by preserving
group bias towards the frequency of higher rank frequency count for each element. In
rare case that an absolute tie occurs, the element will be averaged over the tied element.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rho) non-parametric statistical test is
employed to measure association for the paired rankings (Conover, 1980). This statistic
reflects the degree of association between the ranks of the responses. Association is a
depiction of the relationship between two variables, but does not indicate any causal
relationship (Gibbons, 1976).
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Table 11. ICS IA Controls Grouped Rankings
Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 4)

Group
1

Group
2

Group
1

Group
2

Group
1

Group
2

Mgmnt
Controls

Risk Assessment
Planning
System and Service Acquisition
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments

Operational Controls

Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 15)
Personnel Security
Physical & Environmental Protection
Control Center/Control Room
Portable Devices
Cabling
Contingency Planning
Disaster Recovery Planning
Configuration Management
System and Information Integrity
Malicious Code Detection
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Patch Management
Media Protection
Incident Response
Awareness and Training

Technical Controls

Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 11)
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Physical Token Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
Web Servers
Virtual Local Area Network
Dial-up Modems
Wireless
Audit and Accountability
Encryption
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
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Typically the quality of ordered categorical data is determined from repeated
measurements on the same subject in order to assess the level of agreement between
raters, scales or occasions. Since repeated measurements are not incorporated into the
research design, randomly assigning raters to a group for rank-ordered analysis helps to
preserve the quality of ordered categorical recordings. Consequently, this procedure helps
to identify large departures of inter-rater bias. Table 11 is an illustrated example of the
group rank-ordered items used for the study.
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (Rho)
Rho is a non-parametric measure of the linear relationship between two variables.
When using Spearman’s rho, the null hypothesis indicates the absence of an association
between the two tested variables. The alternative indicates the existence of an association
between the variables. It is similar to the parametric version of Pearson’s productmoment correlation coefficient except it is adjusted for ranked observations (Gibbons,
1976).
This study provided three sets of data for the participants to rank. Set one consists of
4 Management controls items, set two consists of 15 Operational controls, and set three
consists of 11 Technical controls. The rankings are in perfect agreement if the ranks for
each item are identical. They are in perfect disagreement if the ranks are in complete
reverse order (Gibbons, 1976).
The differences between the ranks are used as a measure of their disagreement
(Gibbons, 1976). This measure of disagreement (R) ranges from -1 to 1. When R = 0
there is no association and therefore no agreement or disagreement between the overall
rank comparisons. Similarly, when R = -1 of R = 1, there is either perfect disagreement or
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perfect agreement, respectively, between the overall rank comparisons. The sign of the R
statistic indicates the direction of association, not the strength of association (Conover,
1980). Figure 9 provides the formula for computing Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient (Conover, 1980):

Figure 8. Spearman's Rho (Conover, 1980)
Part II: Recommended ICS Security Controls
Part two consists of 8 recommended ICS controls for comparison and interpretation
of definitions. Measurement level is operationalized through a 5-point Likert scale. The
scale range allows the respondent to choose varying degrees of agreement as follows: (1)
strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree and (5) strongly agree. All five
responses are equally weighted. The 5-point Likert scale is a “higher better” metric
meaning the higher, the value the more favorable the attitude and agreement with the
recommendation provided for the participant. A description and analysis are presented in
the next chapter.
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IV. Data Analysis
The main goal of this research is to ascertain if there is more than marginal consensus
among the US Air Force civil engineering SME community for recommended
information assurance controls to address security concerns specific to DoD SCADA
systems. This chapter presents an overview and analysis of the survey results using the
statistical procedures previously discussed in the methodology section.
Demographic Information
Demographic information was collected from the participants during the survey
process. This information was collected in order to help ensure that the sample was
representative of the desired population as well as for future research. The demographic
portion of the survey contained 5 questions.
Question 1: Major Command Representation
Participants were asked to list which major command (MAJCOM) they are associated
with. Figure 12 provides the MAJCOM representation distribution of the respondents
across the U.S. Air Force. In total, 8 out of 10 (80%) of the MAJCOM’s are represented
in the sample. The two MAJCOM’s not represented were the Air Force Global Strike
Command (AFGSC) and U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Both of these organizations
were targeted for sampling. However, no subjects from either organization volunteered to
participate in the survey. One reason for the lack of participation from AFGSC could be
that the command was recently created in December 2009 and is focused on their
responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
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One reason for the lack of participation from USAFE could be the subjects perceive
their controls systems hosted in foreign countries are potentially outside the scope of this
research effort. Future research in this area should ensure that these two MAJCOM’s are
adequately represented. USAFE units are primarily located throughout Europe and utilize
sufficiently different equipment vendors and SCADA protocols. Therefore, the results of
this research should be validated with USAFE to ensure applicability to their SCADA
environment.
Question 2: Experience
Participant experience with the management or operation of SCADA systems was
collected. The participants were asked to select their experience level from a list of the
following five time periods:
•

less than 1 year

•

1 – 3 years

•

4 -7 years

•

8 – 11 years

•

12 or more years

Table 11 illustrates the distribution of experience among the respondents. The results
indicate that 70% of the respondents have 7 or less years of experience with the
remaining 30% having extensive experience (i.e. 12 or more years). One interesting note
is that 20 percent of the respondents have between one and three year and 20 percent
have less than one year. This finding is interesting in that 40 percent of the participants
are somewhat new to ICS. Although the data does not allow for a rigorous statistical
analysis, the data indicates that 70% of the sample exhibit moderate experience levels. It
is not known why the sample did not contain experience levels at the 8 – 11 years.
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However, this gap is not expected to bias the results since the next higher tier is
represented in the sample.
Table 12. Respondent experience in years
Years of
Experience

Percent of
Subjects
20%
20%
30%
00.0%
30%

Less than one year
1 to 3 years
4 -7 years
8 to 11 years
12 or more

Question 3: Cyber Security Education
Participants were asked to list any computer or network security training they
have completed during their career. The training covered a wide range of subject areas
and was evenly spread across the group. The cyber security orientation of the sample is
considered advanced based on the content of the topic areas provided by the respondents.
Although there are a significant number of respondents relatively new to ICS, the sample
appears to have a diverse background in cyber security education and training. Figure 10
provides the cyber security training distribution of the sample.
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Cyber Security Training
MS CE
20%

UNWT
20%

USAF RED TEAM
20%

SANS 401
20%
WGMT 580
20%

Figure 9. Sample Cyber Security Training
Question 4: Cyber Security Certifications
In addition to education and training, respondents were asked to list any security or IT
certifications they hold. Certifications
ertifications demonstrate knowledge in specific subject areas
and ranged from server/client operations to network/infrastructure security. Some of the
listed certifications are vendor specific such as Cisco
isco Certified Network Associate
(CCNA) and Server
rver Plus (Server
(Server+). Other certifications listed are intended to be vendor
neutral such as the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and
Security Plus (Security+). Certifications are intended to validate a baseline level of
knowledge or skill level. DoD has similarly adopted this philosophy and has
implemented certifications as an essential component of professionalizing the IA
workforce.
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Cyber Security Certifications
CISSP
SERVER+

CCNA

A+
SECURITY+

ITIL
GSEC

NET+

Figure 10
10. Sample Cyber Security Certifications
In total, 8 specific
fic certifications were represented in the sample profile (Figure 11).
11) 5
out of the 8 certifications are contained within the DoD IA certification rubric outlined in
the DoD IA Workforce Improvement Program. Figure 12 provides the DoD Directive
8570 rubric segmented by technical and managerial categories and expertise levels. DoD
personnel configuring, managing, and executing privileged access of SCADA systems
are included in the IA workforce. The distribution of cyber security certifications among
the sample
le provide sufficient evidence that the USAF CE community is well represented
as part of the professional IA workforce. Furthermore, this indicates that the SME
feedback will most likely be grounded on sound security principles underlying the
framework for IA controls.
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Figure 11. DoD Approved Baseline Certification (DoDD 8570)
Question 5: Government Affiliation
The final question in the demographics section asked the respondents to identify the
affiliation with the government. The possible selections were (1) contractor, (2) military
(Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty), (3) Civil Service employee, or (4) other. If the
respondent selected “other”, they were asked to provide a description. In addition, the
respondents were asked to select all categories that apply. This would allow the
respondents to select multiple categories to ensure that appropriate coverage was
considered. For example, there are civil service employees that are also serving in the US
Air Force Reserve as a civil engineer. In this scenario, the participant could identify their
affiliation as a civil service employee and a US Air Force Reserve employee.
Table 13 provides the government affiliation distribution. The sample contains no
contractors, 40% military (75% active duty, 25% reserve, and 0% guard), and 60%
civilians. This mixture provides an adequate representation of the CE community across
the US Air Force enterprise. This study achieved an adequate balance in the affiliation
representation.
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Table 13. Government Affiliation Distribution
Government

Percent of

Affiliation

Subjects
0%
60%
40%

Contractors
Civil Service
Military
-Active Duty (75%)
-Reserve (25 %)

IA Controls Rankings
The next section of the survey instrument asked the participants to rank the various
security controls. Security controls are fundamental safeguards or countermeasures
prescribed for an informational system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the system and its information (Stouffer, K., J. Falco, et al., 2008). The
security controls are grouped according to functional activities required to implement a
safeguard or countermeasure and are identified as a (1) management control, (2)
operational control, or (3) technical control. Participants were asked to independently
rank the controls within each category in order of importance to the management or dayto-day operation of SCADA systems. This approach will help to capture and identify the
perceptions of CE community personnel toward IA controls.
Since repeated measurements for each respondent will not be conducted during this
research, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Random
assignment of respondents to one of two groups for rank-ordered analysis helps to
preserve the quality of ordered categorical recordings. Consequently, this procedure helps
to identify large departures of inter-rater bias. Furthermore, creating two groups prepares
the data for statistical analysis using the Spearman’s rank correlation procedure.
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The sample size is n = 10. The random assignment process placed respondents 1, 3, 5,
8, and 10 in group A, and respondents 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 in group B. The ranked responses
for each group in each security control category were tallied and rank ordered from 1
through k items. Table 14 provides the group ranked data elements to compute
Spearman’s rho statistic figure 9. The rho statistic for this data set is ρ = .972414.
To determine if this result is statistically significant, the ρ must be compared to a
table of critical values for Spearman’s Rho. The level of significance for this research is
set at α = .05. Table 15 shows that the critical value for n = 30 (grouped pairs) at α = .05
is .364. Since ρ = .972414 > .364 we can conclude that the obtained result is statistically
significant at the .05 level of significance. This result is substantial and provides
sufficient evidence to conclude that any high level of agreement or disagreement among
the respondents is not likely to occur by chance.
At this juncture, closer scrutiny of the rankings among the respondents by control
group category will be analyzed. Rankings among the CE SME community will provide
insight of their perceptions of the importance of IA controls relevant to SCADA systems.
This information will be used in conjunction with part III of the survey instrument to
provide depth to the interpretive analysis of the 8 recommended IA controls.
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Technical Controls

Operational Controls

Mgmt
Controls

Table 14. Group ranked data and Spearman's Rho computation
Group A Group B
Ranking Ranking
1
1
3
2
2
3
4
4
5
3
2
2
10
13
12
15
14
14
9
11
6
6
7
10
1
1
3
5
4
4
11
8
15
12
13
7
8
9
1
1
3
3
7
10
2
4
8
8
10
9
11
11
6
7
5
5
4
2
9
6
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D

D2

1
-1
0
2
0
-3
-3
0
-2
0
-3
0
-2
0
3
3
6
-1
0
0
-3
-2
0
1
0
-1
0
2
3
0
sum
rho

1
1
0
4
0
9
9
0
4
0
9
0
4
0
9
9
36
1
0
0
9
4
0
1
0
1
0
4
9
0
124
0.972414

Table 15. Critical values for Spearman’s Rho (Zar, 1982)

N
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

α level of significance
0.05
0.02
1
1
0.886
0.943
0.786
0.893
0.738
0.833
0.683
0.783
0.648
0.746
0.591
0.712
0.544
0.645
0.506
0.601
0.475
0.564
0.450
0.534
0.428
0.508
0.409
0.485
0.392
0.465
0.377
0.448
0.364
0.432

0.01
N/A
1
0.929
0.881
0.833
0.794
0.777
0.715
0.665
0.625
0.591
0.562
0.537
0.515
0.496
0.478

Ranked Management Controls
All respondents had strong agreement with the 1 - 4 rankings of management
controls. They had perfect agreement for item 1 (Risk Assessment) and item 4
(Certification, Accreditation & Security Assessments (C&A)). Item 2 (System and
Service Acquisition) and item 3 (Planning interchanged positions between the two groups
which clearly places these two items in the middle of the rankings. There is no surprise
that risk assessment was ranked number one by the CE SME community. Risks
associated with safety, health, environment-related or economic typically result in
unrecoverable consequences (Stouffer, et al., 2008).
Item 4 – Certification, Accreditation and Security Assessment
What was most revealing among the four rankings in management controls is the
placement of Certification & Accreditation last. C&A is a process that ensures that
systems and major applications adhere to formal and established security requirements
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that are well documented and authorized. C&A is required by the Federal Information
Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. All systems and applications that reside on
U.S. government networks must go through a formal C&A before being put into
production, and every three years thereafter. Since accreditation is the ultimate output of
a C&A initiative, and a system or application cannot be accredited unless it meets
specific security guidelines, clearly the goal of C&A is to force federal agencies to put
into production systems and applications that are secure. This is counter to the perception
expressed by the CE SME community.
Considering that management controls only address a mere 4 items in the
management control category (as compared to 15 operational controls and 11 technical
controls), one would expect C&A to rank high on the list since the process places
emphasis on the system meeting specific security requirements. Further research should
be conducted in this area to ascertain what the contributing factors for this perception gap
are. Table 16 lists the final combined group rankings for the management controls
category.
Table 16. Ranked Management Controls
Rank
1
2
3
4

Management Controls
Risk Assessment
System and Service Acquisition
Planning
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments

Ranked Operational Controls
In the operational control category, the top five ranked controls in order of
importance are (1) System & Information Integrity, (2) Physical and Environmental
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Protection, (3) Personnel Security, (4) Malicious Code Detection, and (5) Intrusion
Detection and Prevention. There was no serious disagreement among the CE SME
community with the top five operational controls. Some rearrangement between items 3
(Personnel Security) and 5 (Intrusion Detection and Prevention) occurred but not
substantial in position to warrant disparity among raters. The bottom three ranked
controls were (13) Media Protection, (14) Portable Devices, and (15) Cabling. These
bottom three rankings did not reveal substantial disagreement in rankings and is not
surprising. Interesting findings for operational controls were in perfect agreement in item
1 (System and Information Integrity), and moderate disagreement between items 6
(Disaster Recovery) and 10 (Contingency Planning).
Item 1 – System and Information Integrity
Information and System Integrity as the number one ranked item under operational
controls is a substantial finding. Table 17 provides the final ranked operational controls.
Table 17. Ranked Operational Controls
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Operational Controls
System and Information Integrity
Physical & Environmental Protection
Personnel Security
Malicious Code Detection
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Disaster Recovery Planning
Configuration Management
Awareness and Training
Patch Management
Contingency Planning
Incident Response
Control Center/Control Room
Media Protection
Portable Devices
Cabling
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Traditionally, SCADA systems were designed as standalone networks with little to no
connectivity to outside networks or systems. They are designed to be monitored through
Human Machine Interface (HMI) on a 24 hour-7 days a week basis with little system
interruption. Under these operating conditions, SCADA systems did not exhibit
significant vulnerabilities to system and information integrity issues. However, the rapid
increase in the use of internetworking protocols and connectivity to enterprise networks
now make SCADA systems increasingly vulnerable to system and information integrity
issues. The CE SME community is likely to have developed an aptitude for recognizing
this vulnerability based on the exposure to the type of cyber security education and cyber
security certifications they have received (see Figure 10 and 11). The importance of this
observation when considering the 14 other operational controls the respondents could
choose from cannot be overstated. This is an operational control priority among the CE
SME community.
Item 6 & 10 – Disaster Recovery and Contingency Planning
Although both groups had perfect agreement of the ranking for disaster recovery
(ranked number six), there was moderate disagreement of the ranking for contingency
planning ranked number (Group A ranked 7, group B ranked 10). Although the
definitions are closely related and have considerable overlap in application, there persists
disagreement on their importance in the rankings. This might be related to the (1)
distributed nature of SCADA systems across a large geographic region, and (2) the
continued upward trend to utilize Internet Protocols for communications paths.
Geographic spread and their associated physical boundary for contingency planning can
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be rationalized and is rather trivial to visualize. However, logical boundaries and the
continued blurring of where SCADA network ends and the Enterprise network begins
along with the associated responsibilities for contingency planning become more difficult
to plan for.
Ranked Technical Controls
In the technical control category, the top five ranked controls in order of importance
are (1) Identification and Authentication, (2) Encryption, (3) Role Base Access Control,
(4) Password Authentication, and (5) Audit & Accountability. There was no serious
disagreement among the CE SME community with the top 5 technical controls. Some
rearrangement for between items 2 (Encryption) and 4 (Password Authentication)
occurred but a not substantial in position to warrant disagreement among raters. Table 18
provides the final ranked technical controls.
Table 18. Ranked Technical Controls
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Technical Controls
Identification and Authentication
Encryption
Role-Based Access Control
Password Authentication
Audit and Accountability
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Wireless
Web Servers
Physical Token Authentication
Virtual Local Area Network
Dial-up Modems
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What is interesting in this segment is how high they ranked encryption. Encryption is
typically the method by which to operationalize confidentiality as a security goal.
Confidentially is usually ranked very low as a security goal in a SCADA environment.
The confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA) triad is a widely used information
assurance model that identifies three fundamental security characteristics (Harris, 2003)
Confidentiality provides some degree of assurance for data privacy. It is a well known
system engineering principal that encryption can degrade the operational performance of
the system (Stouffer, K., J. Falco, et al., 2008). It is also known that availability is a
major design goal for SCADA systems. Therefore, it is an interesting finding that the CE
SME community would rank encryption number two for technical controls.
Analysis of this finding is a bit difficult to interpret. However, one possible
explanation is the perception and alignment gap between confidentiality and integrity
among the respondents. SCADA system traffic does not typically contain messages that
require privacy assurance of content unlike traditional information systems that store,
process, display, and transmit email messages or corporate documents. A possible
explanation is the misconception of the CE SME community of the security goal that is
provided by encryption. They potentially desire to ensure the integrity of response
messages during data acquisition and command messages during supervisory control.
This position is reinforced by the fact that the (1) respondents placed significant value in
System and Information Integrity under the operational controls (ranked number one)
coupled with the (2) moderate amount of cyber security education and cyber security
certifications of the respondents. Encryption can be deployed as part of a comprehensive
security plan. However, encryption is not an appropriate mechanism, in most cases, to
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ensure integrity on SCADA networks. Additional research should be conducted in this
area to further explain the alignment gap between confidentially and integrity among the
CE SME community managing and operating SCADA systems.
IA Controls Agreement Measurements
The final section of the survey instrument contained 8 recommended IA controls
for the participants to review. Of the 8 questions provided, the first three questions
recommend IA control definitions that are not adequately addressed in the DoD IA
controls framework but could fit under an existing IA control category. Five additional
questions recommend IA control definitions and additionally recommend a new subcategory to be added to the DoD IA controls framework. Semantic translation of the
NIST definitions preserved the intent of the specific IA control and made it adaptable to
the DoD IA control framework.
The definitions and associated IA Control category and subcategory were
provided in a table format for ease of comparison by each evaluator. The participants
were asked to express their level of agreement, using a 5-point Likert scale, with the
following criteria; (1) appropriate fit under the major DoD IA control category, (2)
conciseness of the definition, and (3) appropriateness of the new sub-category. Table 19
provides a summary of the responses for all respondents.
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Table 19. DoD IA Controls Response Summary
Part A: Incorporating ICS security control wording to existing DoD IA controls
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Neutral
Agree
Disagree
Agree
Q1: Role Based Access Control to ECLP

00%

00%

10%

50%

40%

Q2: Dial-up Modem to EBRP

00%

10%

00%

40%

50%

Q3: Web Servers to EBRP

00%

30%

10%

20%

40%

Q4:
Q5:
Q6:
Q7:
Q8:

Part B: New DoD IA controls encompassing ICS security not covered by DoD
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree
Disagree
Agree
Physical Environment Toxic
substance (PETS)
00%
00%
10%
50%
40%
Physical Environment Blast
Protection (PEBP)
00%
10%
20%
20%
50%
Physical Environment Access
Controls to ICS Devices (PEAD)
00%
30%
10%
40%
20%
Physical Environment Transmission
Medium Protection (PETP)
10%
00%
00%
30%
60%
Security Design and Configuration
Virtual Partitioning (DCVP)
00%
00%
10%
50%
40%

IA Controls Response Summary Analysis
In order to conduct an analysis of the responses collected, the data was bifurcated into
two major categories. Responses that were affirmative (agree and strongly agree) were
placed in the Agree group. Responses that were negative (disagree and strongly disagree)
were placed in the Disagree group. Responses with a neutral response were excluded
from the analysis. Figure 13 contains the results of the two group comparison listed by
question. The following sections will provide a narrative discussion and analysis of the
results collected.
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IA Control Agreement
10
9
8

Quantity

7
6
5
Disagree

4

Agree

3
2
1
0
ELCP

EBRP

EBRP

PETS

PEBP

PEAD

PETP

DCVP

n =10

Questions

Figure 12. IA Control Agreement

Part A: Questions 1 - 3
Question 1: There is strong SME consensus to add Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) into the Least Privilege DoD IA control subcategory. This result is not
surprising since the SME’s ranked RBAC number 3 of 11 in the technical controls
category.
Question 2: There was slight disagreement from the respondents for placing dial-up
modems under the Remote Access Privilege Function DoD IA control subcategory. The
disagreement is primarily due to a difference in philosophy on remote access among the
respondents. Some subjects stated that as long as the proper security measures were
implemented, allowing remote dialing would be appropriate. Currently, USAF
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Engineering Technical Letter 9-11 mandates the implementation of a voice protection
system (VPS) which has a dial back feature. To illustrate the disagreement, in vivo
extracts collected from respondents are provided below.
One respondent believes this is an adequate security safeguard to restrict remote
access by dial-up modem and states, “[…] it has the ability to do logging activity with
other policy enforcement. The Voice Protection System would add another layer of
protection for all Dial-up Modems in an ICS.”
Another respondent disagreed and stated that “[…] no remote access should be
permitted; only voice-capable modems should be allowed for after hours alarm
notifications.” The final disagreement was essentially over the definition specificity. It
was suggested that the DoD IA controls, as currently written, properly cover general
practices and do not require additional details to describe form and function. Given the
extensive use of modems in SCADA systems, this item remains open for additional
discussion and clarification from the SCADA community at large.
Question 3: There was no consensus on the issue of Web servers as a product option
in SCADA system. The respondents were evenly split on this topic. Web Servers are now
offered as product options on historian servers for access outside of control rooms.
Furthermore, Programmable Logic Controllers, and other control devices are increasingly
being offered with embedded web and email servers to generate email notifications when
certain conditions occur. This is an entirely new area for SCADA systems and operators
alike. Traditional use of these services causes confusion for SCADA personnel when
these services are made available on a control system. This partially explains the split
decision from the CE SME community. A better understanding of how Web services can
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or should be incorporated into control systems is largely unexplored and causes this item
to remain an open issue. Additional discussion and clarification from the SCADA
community at large is required to resolve this item.
The disagreement is primarily due to subjects not seeing the addition of web, ftp, and
email capabilities fitting into the Remote Access for Privilege functions category.
Subjects see it fitting better under a least privileged type of category or a totally new
category. Also, subjects stated that there is no reason for remote access outside of the
control room. There may some rare cases for remote access due to ICS isolation from the
base. Just like Q2, the final disagreement was about wording. The DoD IA covers
general practices and does not go into details pertaining equipment, there is no need to
make it more explicit or detailed for types of functions.
Part B: Questions 4 - 8
Question 4 & 5: There is also majority consensus for including questions 4
(Environmental Control Systems – HVAC) and question 5 (Control Center/Control
Room) as new subcategories in DoD IA controls. However, both questions contained
neutral responses (1 and 2 respectively) and were omitted in the agree/disagree
determination.
Question 6: There is moderate disagreement in the definition and category placement
of question 6 (Portable Devices). Respondents provided narrative that indicates that there
is considerable variation in defining portable devices in a SCADA environment. The
main issue is in an expanded version of portable includes portable equipment used by
field engineers that fall outside the traditional definition of portable devices in the IT
arena. Further work in this area is needed to more succinctly define the scope and
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function of portable devices as they specifically apply to the SCADA environment. This
item will remain open for further discussion by the SCADA community at large.
Question 7: There is strong SME consensus to add question 7 (Cabling) as a new
subcategory (Transmission Medium Protection) under the Physical and Environment
DoD IA control category. The respondents ranked this control last (15 of 15) in the
technical controls category. This does not make it any less important and must be
addressed in any formal cyber risk assessment of a SCADA environment.
Question 8: There is strong SME consensus to add question 8 (Virtual Local Area
Network - VLAN) as a new subcategory (Virtual Partitioning) under the Security Design
and Configuration DoD IA control category. This is not a surprising result. VLAN
architecture is rapidly advancing as a technique to partition portions of the SCADA from
an enterprise network. Although the technique is gaining momentum among the IT
community that must provide service to SCADA components inside the enterprise
network (e.g. historian server or HMI) the security benefits are not well understood at this
juncture. This item should be considered for inclusion in the DoD IA control framework
with an expanded definition.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
There is moderate consensus among the US Air Force civil engineering SME
community for recommended information assurance controls to address security concerns
specific to DoD SCADA Systems. Some DoD IA control definitions should be modified
(listed in chapter IV) to include explicit language relevant to SCADA systems.
The research methodology applied in this study appears to be a sound approach to
conduct an initial estimate of gaps in the current DoD IA control framework. The study
resulted in providing insight into the perceptions of the U.S. Air Force civil engineering
SME community concerning 30 IA controls across three categories. Ranking results (ρ =
.972414) indicate a high preference for encryption, and system and information integrity
as key IA Controls to mitigate cyber risk. Equally interesting was the perfect agreement
among raters on ranking certification and accreditation last as an effective IA control.
Additionally, the respondents strongly favored including four new IA controls of the
eight they considered. Several issues remain open and should be explored with a larger
SME community to reach a consensus.
Recommendations for Future Research
Questions that remain unresolved in this study should be fielded to a wider SME
community and perhaps expanded to other service components. For example, SMEs
indicated a high preference for encryption as a key IA control to mitigate cyber risk while
ranking certification and accreditation last as an effective IA control. This is highly
concerning as the DoD IA community relies very heavily on the C & A process to ensure
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systems confidentiality, integrity and availability. It is reasonable to infer that the DoD
SCADA community finds that the C & A process is lacking or is inadequate to protect
SCADA. Further research should be conducted on this area.
The AF Civil Engineering Support Agency created Engineering Technical Letter
(ETL) 09-11: Civil Engineering Industrial Control System Information Assurance
Compliance to provide technical guidance and criteria for information assurance of civil
engineering ICS’s. Future efforts can be directed at field-testing ETL 9-11
implementation requirements. A thorough analysis of first and second-order effects
caused by ETL 9-11 implementation requirements can be helpful in accurately
forecasting future needs resulting from ETL 9-11. For example, proper ETL
implementation can result in funding shortfalls, contract modifications, or manpower
reallocation.
Determining DoD SCADA vulnerability can be very difficult. Many limitations and
operational restrictions can be imposed to DoD SCADA security and vulnerability
assessments. Future work can focus on developing relevant metrics and sound
methodologies to assess operational SCADA systems.
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Appendix A: CIP Evolution
CIP in the 80’s
In the 1980’s critical infrastructure was considered as public works and
transportation, its protection was important because the services that they provided
“formed the underpinnings of the nation’s defense, a strong economy, and our health and
safety (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).”
The CBO, in 1983 defined infrastructures as facilities with “the common
characteristics of capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels of
government. They are, moreover, directly critical to activity in the nation’s economy
(CBO, 1983).” The CBO included highways, public transit systems, wastewater
treatment works, water resources, air traffic control, airports, and municipal water supply
in this category (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).
CIP in the 90’s
In 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 categorizing critical
infrastructure as “…so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
impact on the defense or economic security of the Unites States (Papa and Shenoi,
2008).” E.O. 13010 went further, by prioritizing particular infrastructure sectors, and
specific assets within those sectors, on the basis of national importance (Moteff and
Parfomak, 2004).
On this decade, concerns about terrorism lead to serious critical infrastructure
efforts (Papa and Shenoi, 2008). Reflecting new realities, a key development on this
decade was the inclusion of the term “cyber” to the definition of critical infrastructures.
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In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 defines “critical” infrastructures as
“those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the
economy and government (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).”
CIP in the 2000’s
Changes resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 characterized
this decade. New government organizations were created, the definition of critical
infrastructure was expanded and new efforts to share and collaborate across
private/government sectors were launched.
In 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13228, establishing the Office of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).
In 2002, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), in addition to
identifying critical infrastructure, it also introduces the concept of “key assets” as a subset
of nationally important key resources (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).
In 2003, The National Strategy for Physical Infrastructure Protection and Key
Assets (NSPP) defines three categories of what it considers to be key assets:
(1) One category of key assets comprises the diverse array of national
monuments, symbols, and icons that represent our Nation’s heritage, traditions and
values, and political power.
(2) Another category of key assets includes facilities and structures that represent
our national economic power and technological advancement.
(3) A third category of key assets includes such structures as prominent
commercial centers, office buildings, and sports stadiums, where large numbers of people
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regularly congregate to conduct business or personal transactions, shop, or enjoy a
recreational pastime (Moteff and Parfomak 2004).
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7) clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying,
prioritizing and protecting critical infrastructure. HSPD-7 specifies a list of
infrastructures; however, it leaves open the possibility that the list could be expanded.
(Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).
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Appendix B: DoD IA Definition of Information Systems Categories
-Automated Information System (AIS) Application: “An AIS application
performs clearly defined functions for which there are readily identifiable security
considerations and needs that are addressed as part of the acquisition. An AIS
application may be a single software application (e.g., integrated Consumable Items
Support (ICIS)); multiple software applications that are related to a single mission (e.g.,
payroll or personnel); or a combination of software and hardware performing a specific
support function across a range of missions (e.g., Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), Defense Messaging System (DMS)) (DoDI 8500.2, 2003).
- Enclave: “Collection of computing environments connected by one or more
internal networks under the control of a single authority and security policy, including
personnel and physical security. Examples of enclaves include local area networks and
the applications they host, backbone networks, and data processing centers” (DoDI
8500.2, 2003).
- Outsourced IT-based Process: “For DoD IA purposes, an outsourced IT-based
process is a general term used to refer to outsourced business processes supported by
private sector information systems, outsourced information technologies, or outsourced
information services. An outsourced IT-based process performs clearly defined functions
for which there are readily identifiable security considerations and needs that are
addressed in both acquisition and operations” (DoDI 8500.2, 2003).
- Platform IT Interconnection (PIT): “For DoD IA purposes, platform IT
interconnection refers to network access to platform IT. Platform IT interconnection has

71

readily identifiable security considerations and needs that must be addressed in both
acquisition, and operations. Platform IT refers to computer resources, both hardware
and software, that are physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the
mission performance of special purpose systems such as weapons, training simulators,
diagnostic test and maintenance equipment, calibration equipment, equipment used in the
research and development of weapons systems, medical technologies, transport vehicles,
buildings, and utility distribution systems such as water and electric” (DoDI 8500.2,
2003).
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Appendix C: Federal Government IA Documents (Abrams, 2007)
The following US government documents help define the cyber security
environment. Regulations and guidance may not always be consistent. This list is not
exhaustive. Other federal laws, regulations, and guidance not listed here may apply.
Many organizations are governed by legislation that specifically applies to that
organization (Abrams, 2007). Note: Attachment was compiled from MITRE Technical
Report MTR070050.

Federal Laws and Regulations
• Public Law 107-347, Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002,
December 17, 2002.
• Public Law 107-296, Critical Information Infrastructure Act of 2002.
• Public Law 104-106, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
• Public Law 99-474, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
• 5 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 552, “The Privacy Act of 1974.”
• 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, “Coordination of Federal Information Policy.”
• United States Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 29, Department of Homeland
Security, “Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information.”

Executive Orders
• Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency
Preparedness
Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984.
• Executive Order 13011, Federal Information Technology, July 16, 1996.
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• Executive Order 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age,
October 16, 2001.
• PDD-63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998.
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3), Homeland Security
Advisory System, March 11, 2002.

Office of Management and Budget
• OMB Circular Number A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources,
February 8, 1996.
• OMB Circular Number A-123, Management Accountability and Control, revised
June 21, 1999.
• OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, Execution of Budgets, July 16, 2004.
• OMB Memorandum M-00-10, Procedures and Guidelines on Implementing the
Government Paperwork Elimination Act, April 25, 2002.
• PDD 12, Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts, August 5, 1993.
• OMB Guide, Evaluating Information Technology Investments;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infotech.html, February 2, 2006

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD), DHS Policy Directive 3,
Homeland Security Advisory System, March 11, 2002.
• HSPD, DHS Policy Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003.
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• HSPD, DHS Policy Directive 12, Common Identification Standard for Federal
Employees and Contractors, August 24, 2004.

Department of Commerce (DOC)
• FIPS 140-2, Security requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001.
• FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2002, change notice February
2004.
• FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), January 2000.
• FIPS 188, Standard Security Labels for Information Transfer, September 1994.
• FIPS 190, Guideline for the Use of Advanced Authentication Technology
Alternatives, September 1994
• FIPS 198, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), March 2002.
• FIPS 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and
Information Systems, February 2004.
• FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and
Information Systems, March 2006.
NIST
•SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: the National Institute of
Standards and Technology Handbook, October 1995.
• SP 800-13, Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications
Management Network, October 1995.
• SP 800-14, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information
Technology Systems, September 1996.
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• SP 800-15, Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC),
Version 1, September 1997.
• SP 800-16, Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Roleand
Performance-Based Model, April 1998.
• SP 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and
Procedures, February 1998.
• SP 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology
Systems, December 1998.
• SP 800-19, Mobile Agent Security, October 1999.
• SP 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA): Requirements and Procedures, October 1999, revised April 2000.
• SP 800-21-1, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government,
Second edition, December 2005.
• SP 800-22, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number
Generators for Cryptographic Applications, October 2000, revised: May 15, 2001.
• SP 800-23, Guideline to Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and
Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated Products, August 2000.
• SP 800-24, PBX Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX Before
Someone Else Does, August 2000.
• SP 800-25, Federal Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures
and Authentication, October 2000.
• SP 800-26, Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology Systems,
November 2001.
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• SP 800-27, Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security
(A Baseline for Achieving Security), Revision A June 2004.
•SP 800-29, A Comparison of the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2, June 2001.
• SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems,
January 2002.
• SP 800-31, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), November 2001.
• SP 800-32, Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI
Infrastructure, February 2001.
• SP 800-33, Underlying Technical Models for Information Technology Security,
December 2001.
• SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems,
June 2002.
• SP 800-35, Guide to Information Technology Security Services, October 2003.
• SP 800-36, Guide to Selecting Information Security Products, October 2003.
• SP 800-37, Guide for Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal
Information Systems, May 2004.
• SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods
and Techniques, December 2001.
• SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication, May 2005.
• SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM
Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, May 2004.
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• SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication, draft April 20,
2006.
• SP 800-40, Procedures for Handling Security Patches, September 2002.
• SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, January 2002.
• SP 800-42, Guideline on Network Security Testing, October 2003.
• SP 800-43, Systems Administration Guidance for Windows 2000 Professional,
November 2002.
• SP 800-44, Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers, September 2002.
• NIST SP 800-45, Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security, September 2002.
• SP 800-46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications,
August 2002.
•SP 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems,
September 2002.
• SP 800-48, Wireless Network Security 802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices,
November 2002.
• SP 800-49, Federal S/MIME V3 Client Profile, November 2002.
• SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training
Program, October 2003.
• SP 800-51, Use of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Vulnerability
Naming Scheme, September 2002.
• SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection and Use of Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Implementations, June 2005.
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• SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems,
February 2005.
• SP 800-53A, Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information
Systems, draft May 4, 2006.
• SP 800-54, Border Gateway Protocol Security, draft September 26, 2006.
• SP 800-55, Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems, July 2003.
• SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, March 2006.
• SP 800-57, Recommendation on Key Management, August 2005.
• SP 800-58, Security Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems, January 2005.
• SP 800-59, Guidelines for Identifying an Information System as a National Security
System, August 2003.
• SP 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems
to Security System, August 2003.
• SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, January 2004.
• SP 800-63, Version 1.0.1, Electronic Authentication Guideline, September 2004.
• SP 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life
Cycle, rev 1 June 2004.
• SP 800-65, Integrating Security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control
Process, January 2005.
• SP 800-66, An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, March 2005.
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•SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher, May 2004.
• SP 800-68, Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT
Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist, October 2005.
• SP 800-69, Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST
Security Configuration Checklist, September 2006.
• SP 800-70, The NIST Security Configuration Checklists Program, May 2005.
• SP 800-72, Guidelines on PDA Forensics, November 2004.
• SP 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, April 2005.
• SP 800-76-1, Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification,
draft September 14, 2006.
• SP 800-77, Guide to IPSec VPNs, December 2005.
• SP 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
Verification, April 2005.
• SP 800-79, Guidelines for the Certification and Accreditation of PIV Card Issuing
Organizations, July 2005.
• SP 800-81, Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, May 2006.
• SP 800-82, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and
Industrial Control System Security, draft September 2006.
• SP 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, November 2005.
• SP 800-84, Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and
Capabilities, September 2006.
• SP 800-85A, PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines
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(SP800-73 compliance), April 2006.
• SP 800-85B, PIV Data Model Conformance Test Guidelines, July 2006.
• SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response,
August 2006.
• SP 800-87, Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted
Organizations, October 2005 (document updated January 17, 2006).
• SP 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, September 2006.
• SP 800-89, Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature
Applications, November 2006.
•SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators, June 2006.
• SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management, September 2006.
• SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) Systems, draft
August 31, 2006.
• SP 800-95, Guide to Secure Web Services, draft August 31, 2006.
• SP 800-96, PIV Card/Reader Interoperability Guidelines, September 2006.
• SP 800-97, Guide to IEEE 802.11i: Robust Security Networks, draft June 5, 2006.
• SP 800-98, Guidance for Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems,
draft September 26, 2006.
• SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, October 2006.
• SP 800-101, Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics, draft August 31, 2006.
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Appendix D: NIST SP 800-82 ICS Controls

NIST SP 800-82
6.1.1

Risk Assessment (Page 6-2)

6.1.2

Planning ((Page 6-3)

6.1.3

System and Service Acquisition (Page 6-4)

6.1.4

Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (Page 6-5)

6.2.1

Personnel Security (Page 6-7)

6.2.2

Physical & Environmental Protection, (Page 6-7)

6.2.2.1

Control Center/Control Room (Page 6-10)

6.2.2.2

Portable Devices (Page 6-10)

6.2.2.3

Cabling (Page 6-10)

6.2.3

Contingency Planning (Page 6-11)

6.2.3.2

Disaster Recovery Planning (Page 6-12)

6.2.4

Configuration Management (Page 6-13)

6.2.6

System and Information Integrity (Page 6-14)

6.2.6.1

Malicious Code Detection (Page 6-15)

6.2.6.2

Intrusion Detection and Prevention (Page 6-15)

6.2.6.3

Patch Management (Page 6-16)

6.2.7

Media Protection (Page 6-18)

6.2.8

Incident Response (Page 6-18)

6.2.9

Awareness and Training (Page 6-21)

6.3.1

Identification and Authentication (Page 6-22)

6.3.1.1

Password Authentication (Page 6-23)

6.3.1.3

Physical Token Authentication (Page 6-25)

6.3.2.1

Role-Based Access Control (Page 6-27)

6.3.2.2

Web Servers (Page 6-28)

6.3.2.3

Virtual Local Area Network (Page 6-28)

6.3.2.4

Dial-up Modems (Page 6-29)

6.3.2.5

Wireless (Page 6-30)
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6.3.3

Audit and Accountability (Page 6-31)

6.3.4.1

Encryption (Page 6-33)

6.3.4.2

Virtual Private Network (VPN) (Page 6-34)
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Appendix E: DoD IA Controls
Control
Number
COAS-1

Control Name

Subject Area

Alternate Site
Designation

Continuity

COAS-2

Alternate Site
Designation

Continuity

COBR-1

Protection of
Backup and
Restoration
Assets

Continuity

CODB-1

Data Backup
Procedures
Data Backup
Procedures

Continuity

CODB-3

Data Backup
Procedures

Continuity

CODP-1

Disaster and
Recovery
Planning

Continuity

CODP-2

Disaster and
Recovery
Planning

Continuity

CODP-3

Disaster and
Recovery
Planning

Continuity

COEB-1

Enclave
Boundary
Defense
Enclave
Boundary
Defense
Scheduled
Exercises and

Continuity

CODB-2

COEB-2

COED-1

Continuity

Continuity

Continuity

DoD IA Control Description (DoD 8500.2)
An alternate site is identified that permits the
partial restoration of mission or business essential
functions.
An alternate site is identified that permits the
restoration of all mission or business essential
functions.
Procedures are in place assure the appropriate
physical and technical protection of the backup
and restoration hardware, firmware, and software,
such as router tables, compilers, and other
security-related system software.
Data backup is performed at least weekly.
Data backup is performed daily, and recovery
media are stored off-site at a location that affords
protection of the data in accordance with its
mission assurance category and confidentiality
level.
Data backup is accomplished by maintaining a
redundant secondary system, not co-located, that
can be activated without loss of data or disruption
to the operation.
A disaster plan exists that provides for the partial
resumption of mission or business essential
functions within 5 days of activation. (Disaster
recovery procedures include business recovery
plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster
recovery plans, and plan acceptance.)
A disaster plan exists that provides for the
resumption of mission or business essential
functions within 24 hours of activation. (Disaster
recovery procedures include business recovery
plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster
recovery plans, and plan acceptance.)
A disaster plan exists that provides for the smooth
transfer of all mission or business essential
functions to an alternate site for the duration of an
event with little or no loss of operational continuity.
(Disaster recovery procedures include business
recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility
disaster recovery plans, and plan acceptance.)
Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site
provides security measures equivalent to the
primary site.
Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site
must be configured identically to that of the
primary site.
The continuity of operations or disaster recovery
plans are exercised annually.
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COED-2

COEF-1

COEF-2

Drills
Scheduled
Exercises and
Drills
Identificatio
n of Essential
Functions
Identification of
Essential
Functions

Continuity

Continuity

Continuity

COMS1
COMS2
COPS-1

Maintenance
Support
Maintenance
Support
Power Supply

Continuity

COPS-2

Power Supply

Continuity

COPS-3

Power Supply

Continuity

COSP-1

Spares and
Parts
Spares and
Parts

Continuity

COSW1

Backup Copies
of Critical SW

Continuity

COTR-1

Trusted
Recovery

Continuity

DCAR-1

Procedural
Review

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCAS-1

Acquisition
Standards

Security
Design and
Configuration

COSP-2

Continuity
Continuity

Continuity

The continuity of operations or disaster recovery
plans or significant portions are exercised semiannually.
Mission and business essential functions are
identified for priority restoration planning.
Mission and business-essential functions are
identified for priority restoration planning along
with all assets supporting mission or businessessential functions (e.g., computer-based
services, data and applications, communications,
physical infrastructure).
Maintenance support for key IT assets is available
to respond within 24 hours of failure.
Maintenance support for key IT assets is available
to respond 24 X 7 immediately upon failure.
Electrical power is restored to key IT assets by
manually activated power generators upon loss of
electrical power from the primary source.
Electrical systems are configured to allow
continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT
assets. This may include an uninterrupted power
supply coupled with emergency generators.
Electrical systems are configured to allow
continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT
assets and all users accessing the key IT assets
to perform mission or business-essential
functions. This may include an uninterrupted
power supply coupled with emergency generators
or other alternate power source.
Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT
assets can be obtained within 24 hours of failure.
Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT
assets are available 24 X 7 immediately upon
failure.
Back-up copies of the operating system and other
critical software are stored in a fire rated container
or otherwise not collocated with the operational
software.
Recovery procedures and technical system
features exist to ensure that recovery is done in a
secure and verifiable manner. Circumstances that
can inhibit a trusted recovery are documented and
appropriate mitigating procedures have been put
in place.
An annual IA review is conducted that
comprehensively evaluates existing policies and
processes to ensure procedural consistency and
to ensure that they fully support the goal of
uninterrupted operations.
The acquisition of all IA- and IA-enabled GOTS IT
products is limited to products that have been
evaluated by the NSA or in accordance with NSA-
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DCBP-1

Best Security
Practices

Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration

DCCB-1

Control Board

DCCB-2

Control Board

DCCS-1

Configuration
Specifications

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCCS-2

Configuration
Specifications

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCCT-1

Compliance
Testing

DCDS-1

Dedicated IA
Services

Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration

approved processes. The acquisition of all IA- and
IA-enabled COTS IT products is limited to
products that have been evaluated or validated
through one of the following sources - the
International Common Criteria (CC) for
Information Security Technology Evaluation
Mutual Recognition Arrangement, the NIAP
Evaluation and Validation Program, or the FIPS
validation program. Robustness requirements, the
mission, and customer needs will enable an
experienced information systems security
engineer to recommend a Protection Profile, a
particular evaluated product or a security target
with the appropriate assurance requirements for a
product to be submitted for evaluation (See also
DCSR-1).
The DoD information system security design
incorporates best security practices such as single
sign-on, PKE, smart card, and biometrics.
All DoD information systems are under the control
of a chartered configuration control board that
meets regularly according to DCPR-1.
All information systems are under the control of a
chartered Configuration Control Board that meets
regularly according to DCPR-1. The IAM is a
voting member of the CCB.
A DoD reference document, such as a security
technical implementation guide or security
recommendation guide constitutes the primary
source for security configuration or implementation
guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IAand IA-enabled IT products that require use of the
product's IA capabilities. If a DoD reference
document is not available, the following are
acceptable in descending order as available: (1)
Commercially accepted practices (e.g., SANS); (2)
Independent testing results (e.g., ICSA); or (3)
Vendor literature.
A DoD reference document such as a security
technical implementation guide or security
recommendation guide constitutes the primary
source for security configuration or implementation
guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IAand IA-enabled IT products that require use of the
product's IA capabilities. If a DoD reference
document is not available, the system owner
works with DISA or NSA to draft configuration
guidance for inclusion in a Departmental reference
guide.
A comprehensive set of procedures is
implemented that tests all patches, upgrades, and
new AIS applications prior to deployment.
Acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated IA
services such as incident monitoring, analysis and
response; operation of IA devices such as
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DCFA-1

Functional
Architecture for
AIS Applications

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCHW1

HW Baseline

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCID-1

Interconnection
Documentation

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCII-1

IA Impact
Assessment

DCIT-1

IA for IT
Services

DCMC1

Mobile Code

Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration

firewalls; or key management services are
supported by a formal risk analysis and approved
by the DoD Component CIO.
For AIS applications, a functional architecture
that identifies the following has been developed
and is maintained: - all external interfaces, the
information being exchanged, and the protection
mechanisms associated with each interface - user
roles required for access control and the access
privileges assigned to each role (See ECAN) unique security requirements (e.g., encryption of
key data elements at rest) - categories of sensitive
information processed or stored by the AIS
application, and their specific protection plans
(e.g., Privacy Act, HIPAA) - restoration priority of
subsystems, processes, or information (See
COEF).
A current and comprehensive baseline inventory
of all hardware (HW) (to include manufacturer,
type, model, physical location and network
topology or architecture) required to support
enclave operations is maintained by the
Configuration Control Board (CCB) and as part of
the SSAA. A backup copy of the inventory is
stored in a fire-rated container or otherwise not
collocated with the original.
For AIS applications, a list of all (potential) hosting
enclaves is developed and maintained along with
evidence of deployment planning and coordination
and the exchange of connection rules and
requirements. For enclaves, a list of all hosted AIS
applications, interconnected outsourced IT-based
processes, and interconnected IT platforms is
developed and maintained along with evidence of
deployment planning and coordination and the
exchange of connection rules and requirements.
Changes to the DoD information system are
assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to
implementation.
Acquisition or outsourcing of IT services explicitly
addresses Government, service provider, and end
user IA roles and responsibilities.
The acquisition, development, and/or use of
mobile code to be deployed in DoD systems
meets the following requirements:
1. Emerging mobile code technologies that have
not undergone a risk assessment by NSA and
been assigned to a Risk Category by the DoD CIO
is not used.
2. Category 1 mobile code is signed with a DoDapproved PKI code signing certificate; use of
unsigned Category 1 mobile code is prohibited;
use of Category 1 mobile code technologies that
cannot block or disable unsigned mobile code
(e.g., Windows Scripting Host) is prohibited.
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DCNR-1

Non-repudiation

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCPA-1

Partitioning the
Application

Security
Design and
Configuration

DCPB-1

IA Program and
Budget

DCPD-1

Public Domain
Software
Controls

Security
Design and
Configuration
Security
Design and
Configuration

DCPP-1

Ports, Protocols,

Security

3. Category 2 mobile code, which executes in a
constrained environment without access to system
resources (e.g., Windows registry, file system,
system parameters, network connections to other
than the originating host) may be used.
4. Category 2 mobile code that does not execute
in a constrained environment may be used when
obtained from a trusted source over an assured
channel (e.g., SIPRNET, SSL connection,
S/MIME, code is signed with a DoD-approved
code signing certificate).
5. Category 3 mobile code may be used.
6. All DoD workstation and host software are
configured, to the extent possible, to prevent the
download and execution of mobile code that is
prohibited.
7. The automatic execution of all mobile code in
email is prohibited; email software is configured to
prompt the user prior to executing mobile code in
attachments.
NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography (e.g.,
DoD PKI class 3 or 4 token) is used to implement
encryption (e.g., AES, 3DES, DES, Skipjack), key
exchange (e.g., FIPS 171), digital signature (e.g.,
DSA, RSA, ECDSA), and hash (e.g., SHA-1, SHA256, SHA-384, SHA-512). Newer standards
should be applied as they become available.
User interface services (e.g., web services)
are physically or logically separated from data
storage and management services (e.g., database
management systems). Separation may be
accomplished through the use of different
computers, different CPUs, different instances of
the operating system, different network addresses,
combinations of these methods, or other methods,
as appropriate.
A discrete line item for Information Assurance is
established in programming and budget
documentation.
Binary or machine executable public domain
software products and other software products
with limited or no warranty such as those
commonly known as freeware or shareware are
not used in DoD information systems unless they
are necessary for mission accomplishment and
there are no alternative IT solutions available.
Such products are assessed for information
assurance impacts, and approved for use by the
DAA. The assessment addresses the fact that
such software products are difficult or impossible
to review, repair, or extend, given that the
Government does not have access to the original
source code and there is no owner who could
make such repairs on behalf of the Government.
DoD information systems comply with DoD ports,
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protocols, and services guidance. AIS
applications, outsourced IT-based processes and
platform IT identify the network ports, protocols,
and services they plan to use as early in the life
cycle as possible and notify hosting enclaves.
Enclaves register all active ports, protocols, and
services in accordance with DoD and DoD
Component guidance.
A configuration management (CM) process is
implemented that includes requirements for:
1. Formally documented CM roles, responsibilities,
and procedures to include the management of IA
information and documentation;
2. A configuration control board that implements
procedures to ensure a security review and
approval of all proposed DoD information system
changes, to include interconnections to other DoD
information systems;
3. A testing process to verify proposed
configuration changes prior to implementation in
the operational environment; and
4. A verification process to provide additional
assurance that the CM process is working
effectively and that changes outside the CM
process are technically or procedurally not
permitted.
All appointments to required IA roles (e.g.,
DAA and IAM/IAO) are established in writing, to
include assigned duties and appointment criteria
such as training, security clearance, and ITdesignation. A System Security Plan is
established that describes the technical,
administrative, and procedural IA program and
policies that govern the DoD information system,
and identifies all IA personnel and specific IA
requirements and objectives (e.g., requirements
for data handling or dissemination, system
redundancy and backup or emergency response).
System libraries are managed and maintained to
protect privileged programs and to prevent or
minimize the introduction of unauthorized code.
The security support structure is isolated by
means of partitions, domains, etc., including
control of access to, and integrity of, hardware,
software, and firmware that perform security
functions. The security support structure maintains
separate execution domains (e.g., address
spaces) for each executing process.
Software quality requirements and validation
methods that are focused on the minimization of
flawed or malformed software that can negatively
impact integrity or availability (e.g., buffer
overruns) are specified for all software
development initiatives.
At a minimum, basic-robustness COTS IA and IA-
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enabled products are used to protect publicly
released information from malicious tampering or
destruction and ensure its availability. The basicrobustness requirements for products are defined
in the Protection Profile Consistency Guidance for
Basic Robustness published under the IATF.
At a minimum, medium-robustness COTS IA and
IA-enabled products are used to protect sensitive
information when the information transits public
networks or the system handling the information is
accessible by individuals who are not authorized
to access the information on the system. The
medium-robustness requirements for products are
defined in the Protection Profile Consistency
Guidance for Medium Robustness published
under the IATF. COTS IA and IA-enabled IT
products used for access control, data separation,
or privacy on sensitive systems already protected
by approved medium-robustness products, at a
minimum, satisfy the requirements for basic
robustness. If these COTS IA and IA-enabled IT
products are used to protect National Security
Information by cryptographic means, NSAapproved key management may be required.
Only high-robustness GOTS or COTS IA and IAenabled IT products are used to protect classified
information when the information transits networks
that are at a lower classification level than the
information being transported. High-robustness
products have been evaluated by NSA or in
accordance with NSA-approved processes. COTS
IA and IA-enabled IT products used for access
control, data separation or privacy on classified
systems already protected by approved highrobustness products at a minimum, satisfy the
requirements for basic robustness. If these COTS
IA and IA-enabled IT products are used to protect
National Security Information by cryptographic
means, NSA-approved key management may be
required.
System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are
configured to ensure that the system remains in a
secure state.
System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are
configured to ensure that the system remains in a
secure state. Tests are provided and periodically
run to ensure the integrity of the system state.
A current and comprehensive baseline inventory
of all software (SW) (to include manufacturer,
type, and version and installation manuals and
procedures) required to support DoD information
system operations is maintained by the CCB and
as part of the C&A documentation. A backup copy
of the inventory is stored in a fire-rated container
or otherwise not collocated with the original.
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Boundary defense mechanisms to include
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the
wide area network, and Internet access is
permitted from a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that
meets the DoD requirement that such contacts are
isolated from other DoD systems by physical or
technical means. All Internet access points are
under the management and control of the enclave.
Internet access is permitted from a demilitarized
zone (DMZ) that meets the DoD requirement that
such contacts are isolated from other DoD
systems by physical or technical means. All
Internet access points are under the management
and control of the enclave.
Boundary defense mechanisms, to include
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the
wide area network, at layered or internal enclave
boundaries, or at key points in the network, as
required. All Internet access is proxied through
Internet access points that are under the
management and control of the enclave and are
isolated from other DoD information systems by
physical or technical means.
Boundary defense mechanisms to include
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the
wide area network, and at layered or internal
enclave boundaries and key points in the network
as required. All Internet access is prohibited.
The DoD information system is compliant with
established DoD connection rules and approval
processes.
Connections between DoD enclaves and the
Internet or other public or commercial wide area
networks require a demilitarized zone (DMZ).
Remote access for privileged functions is
discouraged, is permitted only for compelling
operational needs, and is strictly controlled. In
addition to EBRU-1, sessions employ security
measures such as a VPN with blocking mode
enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the
log for every remote session.
All remote access to DoD information systems, to
include telework access, is mediated through a
managed access control point, such as a remote
access server in a DMZ. Remote access always
uses encryption to protect the confidentiality of the
session. The session-level encryption equals or
exceeds the robustness established in ECCT.
Authenticators are restricted to those that offer
strong protection against spoofing. Information
regarding remote access mechanisms (e.g.,
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Internet address, dial-up connection telephone
number) is protected.
All VPN traffic is visible to network intrusion
detection systems (IDS).
To help prevent inadvertent disclosure of
controlled information, all contractors are identified
by the inclusion of the abbreviation "ctr" and all
foreign nationals are identified by the inclusion of
their two character country code in: - DoD user email addresses (e.g., john.smith.ctr@army.mil
orjohn.smith.uk@army.mil); - DoD user e-mail
display names (e.g., John Smith, Contractor
<john.smith.ctr@army.mil> or John Smith, United
Kingdom <john.smith.uk@army.mil>); and automated signature blocks (e.g., John Smith,
Contractor, J-6K, Joint Staff or John Doe,
Australia, LNO, Combatant Command).
Contractors who are also foreign nationals are
identified as both
(e.g.,john.smith.ctr.uk@army.mil). Country codes
and guidance regarding their use are in FIPS 104.
Access to all DoD information (classified,
sensitive, and public) is determined by both its
classification and user need-to-know. Need-toknow is established by the Information Owner and
enforced by discretionary or role-based access
controls. Access controls are established and
enforced for all shared or networked file systems
and internal websites, whether classified,
sensitive, or unclassified. All internal classified,
sensitive, and unclassified websites are organized
to provide at least three distinct levels of access:
1. Open access to general information that is
made available to all DoD authorized users with
network access. Access does not require an audit
transaction.
2. Controlled access to information that is made
available to all DoD authorized users upon the
presentation of an individual authenticator. Access
is recorded in an audit transaction.
Audit records include:
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to
access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
· Type of event.
Audit records include:
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to
access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
· Type of event.
· Success or failure of event.
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· Successful and unsuccessful logons.
· Denial of access resulting from excessive
number of logon attempts.
· Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or
access port and the reason for the action.
· Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate
safeguards controlled by the system.
Audit records include:
· User ID.
· Successful and unsuccessful attempts to
access security files.
· Date and time of the event.
· Type of event.
· Success or failure of event.
· Successful and unsuccessful logons.
· Denial of access resulting from excessive
number of logon attempts.
· Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or
access port, and the reason for the action.
· Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate
safeguards controlled by the system.
· Data required auditing the possible use of
covert channel mechanisms.
· Privileged activities and other system-level
access.
· Starting and ending time for access to the
system.
· Security relevant actions associated with
periods processing or the changing of security
labels or categories of information.
Audit trail records from all available sources are
regularly reviewed for indications of inappropriate
or unusual activity. Suspected violations of IA
policies are analyzed and reported in accordance
with DoD information system IA procedures.
An automated, continuous on-line monitoring and
audit trail creation capability is deployed with the
capability to immediately alert personnel of any
unusual or inappropriate activity with potential IA
implications, and with a user configurable
capability to automatically disable the system if
serious IA violations are detected.
Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that
data is accessed and changed only by authorized
personnel.
Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that
data is accessed and changed only by authorized
personnel. Access and changes to the data are
recorded in transaction logs that are reviewed
periodically or immediately upon system security
events. Users are notified of time and date of the
last change in data content.
COMSEC activities comply with DoD Directive C5200.5.
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If required by the information owner, NIST-certified
cryptography is used to encrypt stored sensitive
information.
If required by the information owner, NIST-certified
cryptography is used to encrypt stored classified
non-SAMI information.
If a classified enclave contains SAMI and is
accessed by individuals lacking an appropriate
clearance for SAMI, then NSA-approved
cryptography is used to encrypt all SAMI stored
within the enclave.
Enclave Computing Environment

Classified data transmitted through a network that
is cleared to a lower level than the data being
transmitted are separately encrypted using NSAapproved cryptography (See also DCSR-3).
Transaction-based systems (e.g., database
management systems, transaction processing
systems) implement transaction roll-back and
transaction journaling, or technical equivalents.
Discretionary access controls are a sufficient IA
mechanism for connecting DoD information
systems operating at the same classification, but
with different need-to-know access rules. A
controlled interface is required for interconnections
among DoD information systems operating at
different classifications levels or between DoD and
non-DoD systems or networks. Controlled
interfaces are addressed in separate guidance.
Host-based intrusion detection systems are
deployed for major applications and for network
management assets, such as routers, switches,
and domain name servers (DNS).
Instant messaging traffic to and from instant
messaging clients that are independently
configured by end users and that interact with a
public service provider is prohibited within DoD
information systems. Both inbound and outbound
public service instant messaging traffic is blocked
at the enclave boundary. Note: This does not
include IM services that are configured by a DoD
AIS application or enclave to perform an
authorized and official function.
The system automatically records the creation,
deletion, or modification of confidentiality or
integrity labels, if required by the information
owner.
Successive logon attempts are controlled using
one or more of the following:
· Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful
logon attempts.
· The number of access attempts in a given
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period is limited.
· A time-delay control system is employed. If the
system allows for multiple logon sessions for each
user ID, the system provides a capability to control
the number of logon sessions.
Successive logon attempts are controlled
using one or more of the following:
· Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful
logon attempts.
· The number of access attempts in a given
period is limited.
· A time-delay control system is employed. If the
system allows for multiple logon sessions for each
user ID, the system provides a capability to control
the number of logon sessions. Upon successful
logon, the user is notified of the date and time of
the user's last logon, the location of the user at
last logon, and the number of unsuccessful logon
attempts using this user ID since the last
successful logon.
Access procedures enforce the principles of
separation of duties and "least privilege." Access
to privileged accounts is limited to privileged
users. Use of privileged accounts is limited to
privileged functions; that is, privileged users use
non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged
functions. This control is in addition to an
appropriate security clearance and need-to-know
authorization.
Information and DoD information systems that
store, process, transit, or display data in any form
or format that is not approved for public release
comply with all requirements for marking and
labeling contained in policy and guidance
documents such as DoD 5200.1R. Markings and
labels clearly reflect the classification or sensitivity
level, if applicable, and any special dissemination,
handling, or distribution instructions.
Conformance testing that includes periodic,
unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for
specific penetration testing to ensure compliance
with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as
the DoD IAVA or other DoD IA practices is
planned, scheduled, and conducted. Testing is
intended to ensure that the system's IA
capabilities continue to provide adequate
assurance against constantly evolving threats and
vulnerabilities.
Conformance testing that includes periodic,
unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for
specific penetration testing to ensure compliance
with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as
the DoD IAVA or other DoD IA practices is
planned, scheduled, conducted, and
independently validated. Testing is intended to
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ensure that the system's IA capabilities continue to
provide adequate assurance against constantly
evolving threats and vulnerabilities.
An effective network device control program (e.g.,
routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and
includes: instructions for restart and recovery
procedures; restrictions on source code access,
system utility access, and system documentation;
protection from deletion of system and application
files, and a structured process for implementation
of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA).
An effective network device control program (e.g.,
routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and
includes: instructions for restart and recovery
procedures; restrictions on source code access,
system utility access, and system documentation;
protection from deletion of system and application
files, and a structured process for implementation
of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA). Audit or other
technical measures are in place to ensure that the
network device controls are not compromised.
Change controls are periodically tested.
Information in transit through a network at the
same classification level, but which must be
separated for need-to-know reasons, is encrypted,
at a minimum, with NIST-certified cryptography.
This is in addition to ECCT (encryption for
confidentiality – data in transit).
SAMI information in transit through a network at
the same classification level is encrypted using
NSA-approved cryptography. This is to separate it
for need-to-know reasons. This is in addition to
ECCT (encryption for confidentiality – data in
transit).
All privileged user accounts are established and
administered in accordance with a role-based
access scheme that organizes all system and
network privileges into roles (e.g., key
management, network, system administration,
database administration, web-administration). The
IAM tracks privileged role assignments.
Application programmer privileges to change
production code and data are limited and are
periodically reviewed.
Application programmer privileges to change
production code and data are limited and reviewed
every 3 months.
All authorizations to the information contained
within an object are revoked prior to initial
assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject
from the system's pool of unused objects. No
information, including encrypted representations of
information, produced by a prior subject's actions
is available to any subject that obtains access to
an object that has been released back to the
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system. There is absolutely no residual data from
the former object.
Tools are available for the review of audit records
and for report generation from audit records.
If the DoD information system contains sources
and methods intelligence (SAMI), then audit
records are retained for 5 years. Otherwise, audit
records are retained for at least 1 year.
For Enclaves and AIS applications, all DoD
security configuration or implementation guides
have been applied.
Change controls for software development are in
place to prevent unauthorized programs or
modifications to programs from being
implemented.
Change controls for software development are in
place to prevent unauthorized programs or
modifications to programs from being
implemented. Change controls include review and
approval of application change requests and
technical system features to assure that changes
are executed by authorized personnel and are
properly implemented.
The audit records are backed up not less than
weekly onto a different system or media than the
system being audited.
Measures to protect against compromising
emanations have been implemented according to
DoD Directive S-5200.19.
Good engineering practices with regards to the
integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS and custom
developed solutions are implemented for incoming
and outgoing files, such as parity checks and
cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs).
Good engineering practices with regards to the
integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS, and
custom developed solutions are implemented for
incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks
and cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs).
Mechanisms are in place to assure the integrity of
all transmitted information (including labels and
security parameters) and to detect or prevent the
hijacking of a communication session (e.g.,
encrypted or covert communication channels).
The contents of audit trails are protected against
unauthorized access, modification or deletion.
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic to and
from workstation IP telephony clients that are
independently configured by end users for
personal use is prohibited within DoD information
systems. Both inbound and outbound individually
configured voice over IP traffic is blocked at the
enclave boundary. Note: This does not include
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VoIP services that are configured by a DoD AIS
application or enclave to perform an authorized
and official function.
All Servers, workstations and mobile computing
devices (i.e. laptop, PDAs) implement virus
protection that includes a capability for automatic
updates.
All users are warned that they are entering a
Government information system, and are provided
with appropriate privacy and security notices to
include statements informing them that they are
subject to monitoring, recording and auditing.
Wireless computing and networking capabilities
from workstations, laptops, personal digital
assistants (PDAs), handheld computers, cellular
phones, or other portable electronic devices are
implemented in accordance with DoD wireless
policy, as issued. (See also ECCT). Unused
wireless computing capabilities internally
embedded in interconnected DoD IT assets are
normally disabled by changing factory defaults,
settings or configurations prior to issue to end
users. Wireless computing and networking
capabilities are not independently configured by
end users.
A comprehensive account management process is
implemented to ensure that only authorized users
can gain access to workstations, applications, and
networks and that individual accounts designated
as inactive, suspended, or terminated are
promptly deactivated.
Group authenticators for application or network
access may be used only in conjunction with an
individual authenticator. Any use of group
authenticators not based on the DoD PKI has
been explicitly approved by the Designated
Approving Authority (DAA).
DoD information system access is gained through
the presentation of an individual identifier (e.g., a
unique token or user login ID) and password. For
systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual
identifier, passwords are, at a minimum, a case
sensitive 8-character mix of upper case letters,
lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters, including at least one of each (e.g.,
emPagd2!). At least four characters must be
changed when a new password is created.
Deployed/tactical systems with limited data input
capabilities implement the password to the extent
possible.
Registration to receive a user ID and password
includes authorization by a supervisor, and is
done in person before a designated registration
authority. Additionally, to the extent system
capabilities permit, system mechanisms are
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implemented to enforce automatic expiration of
passwords and to prevent password reuse. All
factory set, default or standard-user IDs and
passwords are removed or changed.
Authenticators
are protected commensurate with the
classification or sensitivity of the information
accessed; they are not shared; and they are not
embedded in access scripts or stored on function
keys. Passwords are encrypted both for storage
and for transmission.
DoD information system access is gained through
the presentation of an individual identifier (e.g., a
unique token or user logon ID) and password. For
systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual
identifier, passwords are, at a minimum, a case
sensitive, 8-character mix of upper case letters,
lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters, including at least one of each (e.g.,
emPagd2!). At least four characters must be
changed when a new password is created.
Deployed/tactical systems with limited data input
capabilities implement these measures to the
extent possible. Registration to receive a user ID
and password includes authorization by a
supervisor, and is done in person before a
designated registration authority. Multiple forms of
certification of individual identification such as a
documentary evidence or a combination of
documents and biometrics are presented to the
registration authority. Additionally, to the extent
capabilities permit, system mechanisms are
implemented to enforce automatic expiration of
passwords and to prevent password reuse, and
processes are in place to validate that passwords
are sufficiently strong to resist cracking and other
attacks intended to discover a user's password).
All factory set, default or standard-user IDs and
passwords are removed or changed.
Authenticators are protected commensurate with
the classification or sensitivity of the information
accessed; they are not shared; and they are not
embedded in access scripts or stored on function
keys. Passwords are encrypted both for storage
and for transmission.
Symmetric Keys are produced, controlled, and
distributed using NIST-approved key management
technology and processes. Asymmetric Keys are
produced, controlled, and distributed using DoD
PKI Class 3 certificates or pre-placed keying
material.
Symmetric Keys are produced, controlled and
distributed using NSA-approved key management
technology and processes. Asymmetric Keys are
produced, controlled, and distributed using DoD
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PKI Medium Assurance or High Assurance
certificates and hardware security tokens that
protect the user's private key.
Symmetric and asymmetric keys are produced,
controlled and distributed using NSA-approved
key management technology and processes.
Identification and authentication is accomplished
using the DoD PKI Class 3 certificate and
hardware security token (when available).
Identification and authentication is accomplished
using the DoD PKI Class 3 or 4 certificate and
hardware security token (when available) or an
NSA-certified product.
Only authorized personnel with a need-to-know
are granted physical access to computing facilities
that process sensitive information or unclassified
information that has not been cleared for release.
Only authorized personnel with appropriate
clearances are granted physical access to
computing facilities that process classified
information.
All documents, equipment, and machine-readable
media containing sensitive data are cleared and
sanitized before being released outside of the
Department of Defense according to DoD 5200.1R and ASD(C3I) Memorandum, dated June 4,
2001, subject: "Disposition of Unclassified DoD
Computer Hard Drives."
All documents, equipment, and machine-readable
media containing classified data are cleared and
sanitized before being released outside its security
domain according to DoD 5200.1-R.
All documents, machine-readable media, and
equipment are destroyed using procedures that
comply with DoD policy (e.g., DoD 5200.1-R).
Devices that display or output classified or
sensitive information in human-readable form are
positioned to deter unauthorized individuals from
reading the information.
An automatic emergency lighting system is
installed that covers emergency exits and
evacuation routes.
An automatic emergency lighting system is
installed that covers all areas necessary to
maintain mission or business essential functions,
to include emergency exits and evacuation routes.
Battery-operated or electric stand-alone smoke
detectors are installed in the facility.
A servicing fire department receives an automatic
notification of any activation of the smoke
detection or fire suppression system.
Computing facilities undergo a periodic fire
marshal inspection. Deficiencies are promptly
resolved.
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PEFS-1

Fire
Suppression

Physical and
Environmental

PEFS-2

Fire
Suppression

Physical and
Environmental

PEHC-1

Humidity
Controls

Physical and
Environmental

PEHC-2

Humidity
Controls

Physical and
Environmental

PEMS-1

Master Power
Switch

Physical and
Environmental

PEPF-1

Physical
Protection of
Facilities

Physical and
Environmental

PEPF-2

Physical
Protection of
Facilities

Physical and
Environmental

PEPS-1

Physical
Security Testing

Physical and
Environmental

PESL-1

Screen Lock

Physical and
Environmental

PESP-1

Workplace
Security
Procedures

Physical and
Environmental

Handheld fire extinguishers or fixed fire hoses are
available should an alarm be sounded or a fire be
detected.
A fully automatic fire suppression system is
installed that automatically activates when it
detects heat, smoke, or particles.
Humidity controls are installed that provide an
alarm of fluctuations potentially harmful to
personnel or equipment operation; adjustments to
humidifier/de-humidifier systems may be made
manually.
Automatic humidity controls are installed to
prevent humidity fluctuations potentially harmful to
personnel or equipment operation.
A master power switch or emergency cut-off
switch to IT equipment is present. It is located
near the main entrance of the IT area and it is
labeled and protected by a cover to prevent
accidental shut-off.
Every physical access point to facilities housing
workstations that process or display sensitive
information or unclassified information that has not
been cleared for release is controlled during
working hours and guarded or locked during nonwork hours.
Every physical access point to facilities housing
workstations that process or display classified
information is guarded or alarmed 24 X 7.
Intrusion alarms are monitored. Two (2) forms of
identification are required to gain access to the
facility (e.g., ID badge, key card, cipher PIN,
biometrics). A visitor log is maintained.
A facility penetration testing process is in place
that includes periodic, unannounced attempts to
penetrate key computing facilities.
Unless there is an overriding technical or
operational problem, workstation screen-lock
functionality is associated with each workstation.
When activated, the screen-lock function places
an unclassified pattern onto the entire screen of
the workstation, totally hiding what was previously
visible on the screen. Such a capability is enabled
either by explicit user action or a specified period
of workstation inactivity (e.g., 15 minutes). Once
the workstation screen-lock software is activated,
access to the workstation requires knowledge of a
unique authenticator. A screen lock function is not
considered a substitute for logging out (unless a
mechanism actually logs out the user when the
user idle time is exceeded).
Procedures are implemented to ensure the proper
handling and storage of information, such as endof-day security checks, unannounced security
checks, and, where appropriate, the imposition of
a two-person rule within the computing facility.
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PESS-1

Storage

Physical and
Environmental

PETC-1

Temperature
Controls

Physical and
Environmental

PETC-2

Temperature
Controls

Physical and
Environmental

PETN-1

Environmental
Control Training
Visitor Control
to Computing
Facilities
Voltage
Regulators
Access to
Information

Physical and
Environmental
Physical and
Environmental

PRAS-2

Access to
Information

Personnel

PRMP-1

Maintenance
Personnel

Personnel

PRMP-2

Maintenance
Personnel

Personnel

PRNK-1

Access to Needto-Know
Information

Personnel

PEVC-1

PEVR-1
PRAS-1

Physical and
Environmental
Personnel

Documents and equipment are stored in approved
containers or facilities with maintenance and
accountability procedures that comply with DoD
5200.1-R.
Temperature controls are installed that provide an
alarm when temperature fluctuations potentially
harmful to personnel or equipment operation are
detected; adjustments to heating or cooling
systems may be made manually.
Automatic temperature controls are installed to
prevent temperature fluctuations potentially
harmful to personnel or equipment operation.
Employees receive initial and periodic training in
the operation of environmental controls.
Current signed procedures exist for controlling
visitor access and maintaining a detailed log of all
visitors to the computing facility.
Automatic voltage control is implemented for key
IT assets.
Individuals requiring access to sensitive
information are processed for access authorization
in accordance with DoD personnel security
policies.
Individuals requiring access to classified
information are processed for access authorization
in accordance with DoD personnel security
policies.
Maintenance is performed only by authorized
personnel. The process for determining
authorization and the list of authorized
maintenance personnel is documented.
Maintenance is performed only by authorized
personnel. The process for determining
authorization and the list of authorized
maintenance personnel is documented. Except as
authorized by the DAA, personnel who perform
maintenance on classified DoD information
systems are cleared to the highest level of
information on the system. Cleared personnel who
perform maintenance on a classified DoD
information system require an escort unless they
have authorized access to the computing facility
and the DoD information system. If uncleared or
lower-cleared personnel are employed, a fully
cleared and technically qualified escort monitors
and records all activities in a maintenance log.
The level of detail required in the maintenance log
is determined by the IAM. All maintenance
personnel comply with DAA requirements for U.S.
citizenship, which are explicit for all classified
systems.
Only individuals who have a valid need-to-know
that is demonstrated by assigned official
Government duties and who satisfy all personnel
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PRRB-1

Security Rules
of Behavior or
Acceptable Use
Policy

Personnel

PRTN-1

Information
Assurance
Training

Personnel

VIIR-1

Incident
Response
Planning

Vulnerability
and Incident
Management

VIIR-2

Incident
Response
Planning

Vulnerability
and Incident
Management

VIVM-1

Vulnerability
Management

Vulnerability
and Incident
Management

security criteria (e.g., IT position sensitivity
background investigation requirements outlined in
DoD 5200.2-R) are granted access to information
with special protection measures or restricted
distribution as established by the information
owner.
A set of rules that describe the IA operations of
the DoD information system and clearly delineate
IA responsibilities and expected behavior of all
personnel is in place. The rules include the
consequences of inconsistent behavior or noncompliance. Signed acknowledgement of the rules
is a condition of access.
A program is implemented to ensure that upon
arrival and periodically thereafter, all personnel
receive training and familiarization to perform their
assigned IA responsibilities, to include
familiarization with their prescribed roles in all IArelated plans such as incident response,
configuration management and COOP or disaster
recovery.
An incident response plan exists that identifies the
responsible CND Service Provider in accordance
with DoD Instruction O-8530.2 and CJCS
Instruction 6510.01D, defines reportable incidents,
outlines a standard operating procedure for
incident response to include INFOCON, provides
for user training, and establishes an incident
response team. The plan is exercised at least
annually.
An incident response plan exists that identifies the
responsible CND Service Provider in accordance
with DoD Instruction O-8530.2 and CJCS
Instruction 6510.01D, defines reportable incidents,
outlines a standard operating procedure for
incident response to include INFOCON, provides
for user training, and establishes an incident
response team. The plan is exercised at least
every 6 months.
A comprehensive vulnerability management
process that includes the systematic identification
and mitigation of software and hardware
vulnerabilities is in place. Wherever system
capabilities permit, mitigation is independently
validated through inspection and automated
vulnerability assessment or state management
tools. Vulnerability assessment tools have been
acquired, personnel have been appropriately
trained, procedures have been developed, and
regular internal and external assessments are
conducted. For improved interoperability,
preference is given to tools that express
vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) naming convention and use the
Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL)
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to test for the presence of vulnerabilities.
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Appendix F: IA Control Correlation
Correlation Code 8

Strength Correlation
8. NIST requirement and DoD IA control are equivalent.
NIST
DoD IA Controls
R Rank
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)?
6.1.3
System and Services Acquisition
DCAS-1
Acquisition Standards
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
COPS-1
Power Supply
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PECF-1
Access to Computing Facilities
6.2.2.1
Control Center/Control Room
COAS-2
Alternate Site Designation
6.2.2.1
Control Center/Control Room
PECF-1
Access to Computing Facilities
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COAS-1
Alternate Site Designation
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COBR-1
Protection of Backup and Restoration Assets
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
CODB-1
Data Backup Procedures
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
COBR-1
Protection of Backup and Restoration Assets
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
CODB-1
Data Backup Procedures
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCII-1
IA Impact Assessment
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCIT-1
IA for IT Services
6.2.6.1
Malicious Code Detection
ECVP-1
Virus Protection
6.2.6.3
Patch Management
DCCT-1
Compliance Testing
6.2.8
Incident Response
PRTN-1
Information Assurance Training
6.2.9
Awareness and Training
PETN-1
Environmental Control Training
6.3.3
Audit and Accountability
ECRG-1
Audit Reduction and Report Generation
6.3.4.1
Encryption
DCNR-1
Non-repudiation
6.3.4.1
Encryption
IAKM-3
Key Management
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Correlation Code 9

Strength Correlation
9. NIST requirement is more specific than the DoD IA control.
NIST
DoD IA Controls
R Rank
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)?
6.2.3.4
Dial-Up Modems
EBRP-1
Remote Access for Privileged Functions
6.3.1.1
Password Authentication
IAIA-1
Individual Identification and Authentication
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Correlation Code 17
Strength Correlation
17. NIST requirement is less specific than the DoD IA control.
NIST

DoD IA Controls

Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)?
6.1.1
Risk Assessment
VIVM-1
Vulnerability Management
6.1.2
Planning
DCSD-1
IA Documentation
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PRAS-1
Access to Information
6.2.1
Personnel Security
PRNK-1
Access to Need-to-Know Information
6.2.1
Personnel Security
COPS-1
Power Supply
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
ECND-1
Network Device Controls
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PECF-2
Access to Computing Facilities
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PEHC-1
Humidity Controls
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PEMS-1
Master Power Switch
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PEPF-1
Physical Protection of Facilities
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PESS-1
Storage
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
PETC-1
Temperature Controls
6.2.2.1
Control Center/Control Room
PECF-2
Access to Computing Facilities
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
CODP-1
Disaster and Recovery Planning
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COEB-1
Enclave Boundary Defense
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COED-1
Scheduled Exercises and Drills
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COEF-1
Identification of Essential Functions
6.2.3
Contingency Planning
COTR-1
Trusted Recovery
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
CODP-1
Disaster and Recovery Planning
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
COEB-1
Enclave Boundary Defense
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
COED-1
Scheduled Exercises and Drills
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
COEF-1
Identification of Essential Functions
6.2.3.2
Disaster Recovery Planning
COMS-1
Maintenance Support
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCCB-1
Control Board
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCFA-1
Functional Architecture for AIS Applications
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCPD-1
Public Domain Software Controls
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCPR-1
CM Process
6.2.4
Configuration Management
DCSQ-1
Software Quality
6.2.4
Configuration Management
ECSD-1
Software Development Change Controls
6.2.6
System and Information Integrity
DCPA-1
Partitioning the Application
6.2.6
System and Information Integrity
DCSD-1
IA Documentation
6.2.6.2
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
EBBD-1
Boundary Defense
6.2.6.2
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
EBVC-1
VPN Controls
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Rank

6.2.6.2
6.2.7
6.2.7
6.2.7
6.2.7
6.2.7
6.2.7
6.2.8
6.2.8
6.3.1.3
6.3.2.1
6.3.2.1
6.3.2.2
6.3.2.3
6.3.2.4
6.3.2.5
6.3.2.5
6.3.3
6.3.3
6.3.3
6.3.3
6.3.3
6.3.3
6.3.4.1
6.3.4.1
6.3.4.1
6.3.4.1
6.3.4.1
6.3.4.2
6.3.4.2
6.3.4.2
6.3.4.2

Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Media Protection
Media Protection
Media Protection
Media Protection
Media Protection
Media Protection
Incident Response
Incident Response
Physical Token Authentication
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Web Servers
Virtual Local Area Network (Vlan)
Dial-Up Modems
Wireless
Wireless
Audit and Accountability
Audit and Accountability
Audit and Accountability
Audit and Accountability
Audit and Accountability
Audit and Accountability
Encryption
Encryption
Encryption
Encryption
Encryption
Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private Network

ECID-1
ECML-1
PECS-1
PEDD-1
PEDI-1
PESP-1
PESS-1
VIIR-1
VIVM-1
IATS-1
ECAN-1
ECPA-1
ECLP-1
DCPA-1
EBRU-1
DCCS-1
ECWN-1
ECAR-1
ECAT-1
ECCD-1
ECMT-1
ECTB-1
ECTP-1
DCSR-1
ECCR-1
ECCT-1
ECNK-1
IAKM-1
DCSR-1
EBRP-1
EBRU-1
EBVC-1
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Host Based IDS
Marking and Labeling
Clearing and Sanitizing
Destruction
Data Interception
Workplace Security Procedures
Storage
Incident Response Planning
Vulnerability Management
Token and Certificate Standards
Access for Need-to-Know
Privileged Account Control
Least Privilege
Partitioning the Application
Remote Access for User Functions
Configuration Specifications
Wireless Computing and Network
Audit Record Content – Public Systems
Audit Trail, Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting
Changes to Data
Conformance Monitoring and Testing
Audit Trail Backup
Audit Trail Protection
Specified Robustness - Basic
Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Rest)
Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Transmit)
Encryption for Need-To-Know
Key Management
Specified Robustness - Basic
Remote Access for Privileged Functions
Remote Access for User Functions
VPN Controls

Correlation Code 11

Strength Correlation
11. NIST requirement has no counterpart in the DoD IA control.
NIST
DoD IA Controls
R Rank
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)?
6.2.2
Physical and Environmental Protection
~PETS
Toxic Substance Controls
6.2.2.1
Control Center/Control Room
~PEBP
Blast Protection
6.2.2.2
Portable Devices
~PEAD
Access Control to IT Devices
6.2.2.3
Cabling
~PETP
Physical Protection of Transmition Medium
6.3.2.3
Virtual Local Area Network (Vlan)
`DCVP
Virtual Partitioning
6.3.2.1
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
ECLP
Enclave Computing Environment
6.3.2.2
Web Servers
EBRP
Enclave Boundary Defense
6.3.2.4
Dial-Up Modem
EBRP
Enclave Boundary Defense
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Appendix G: Survey Approval Letter
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Appendix H: Survey Instrument

Proposed Information Assurance controls for DoD Industrial
Control Systems
Primary Investigators: Lt Col J.W. Humphries and Mr. J. Lopez Jr.
Student Researcher: Capt E.A. Mendezllovet
Research Sponsor: HQ USAF A4/7 and AFCESA
Purpose: To seek USAF Civil Engineering SME consensus for proposed Information
Assurance controls to address security concerns specific to DoD Industrial Control
Systems
Background: The current DoD Information Assurance (IA) controls were last published
in 2003 and do not adequately address cyber security aspects unique to Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. This
research effort combines recommended best practices from a variety of sources to derive
a specific set of IA controls that can be incorporated into the DoD IA control framework.
Many ICS or SCADA IA controls map to the DoD framework with no translation
required. However, other IA controls were so specific to ICS or SCADA that some
interpretation or translation is required. This survey contains the set of ICS or SCADA IA
controls:
That require translation to fit into an “existing” DoD IA control subject category
That require interpretation to fit into a “newly created” DoD IA control subject
category
The rest of this survey is organized into three parts: (1) Demographics, (2) Ranking of
ICS IA control category areas, and (3) Likert scale measurement of proposed new IA
controls subject categories. Instructions are provided for part II and III of the survey.
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PART I - Demographics:
1. What Major Command are you affiliated with (select only one)?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

ACC
AETC
AFGSC
AFMC
AFRC
AFSPC

g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

AFSOC
AMC
PACAF
USAFE
Other: _____________

2. How many years of experience in Control Systems do you have?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Less than one year
1-3 years
4-7 years
8-11 years
Twelve or more years

3. What computer security or network security training have you completed, list all that
apply?
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
4. What certifications have you successfully completed (e.g. Security+), list all that
apply?
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
5. What is your affiliation with the government (Select all that apply)?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Contractor
Military (Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty)
Civil Service employee
Other (Describe) _______________________________
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PART II - Rankings:
Instructions: Rank the following ICS security controls in order of importance for the dayto-day operations of USAF control systems. The rankings are grouped by control
category area (i.e. three separate grouped rankings). Place importance on the graveness of
the impact if the service becomes disrupted or unavailable. Start with “one” being the
most important. Note: Email attachment contains control definitions

Managem
ent Controls

Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 4)
Risk Assessment (Page 6-2)
Planning ((Page 6-3)
System and Service Acquisition (Page 6-4)
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (Page 6-5)
Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 15)
Personnel Security (Page 6-7)
Physical & Environmental Protection, (Page 6-7)
Control Center/Control Room (Page 6-10)
Portable Devices (Page 6-10)
Operational Controls

Rank

Rank

Cabling (Page 6-10)
Contingency Planning (Page 6-11)
Disaster Recovery Planning (Page 6-12)
Configuration Management (Page 6-13)
System and Information Integrity (Page 6-14)
Malicious Code Detection (Page 6-15)
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (Page 6-15)
Patch Management (Page 6-16)
Media Protection (Page 6-18)
Incident Response (Page 6-18)
Awareness and Training (Page 6-21)
Control Area Category (Rankings: 1 - 11)
Identification and Authentication (Page 6-22)

Technical Controls

Password Authentication (Page 6-23)
Physical Token Authentication (Page 6-25)
Role-Based Access Control (Page 6-27)
Web Servers (Page 6-28)
Virtual Local Area Network (Page 6-28)
Dial-up Modems (Page 6-29)
Wireless (Page 6-30)
Audit and Accountability (Page 6-31)
Encryption (Page 6-33)
Virtual Private Network (VPN) (Page 6-34)
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Rank

PART III – Agreement Measurements:
Part A:

Least Privilege (LP): Access procedures enforce the
principles of separation of duties and "least privilege."
Access to privileged accounts is limited to privileged
users. Use of privileged accounts is limited to
privileged functions; that is, privileged users use nonprivileged accounts for all non-privileged functions.
This control is in addition to an appropriate security
clearance and need-to-know authorization

Stronly
Agree

Agree

B. ICS IA
Neutral

Enclave Computing Environment (EC)

Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: ECLP

Stronly
Disagree

Instructions: This part contains three ICS IA controls that are not specifically addressed in the DoD IA control framework.
Given their relevance and importance in a control systems environment, do you agree that the ICS security topic in column B
should be incorporated to the DoD IA control in column A? Using a 5-point scale, indicate your level of agreement with
incorporating ICS security control to the DoD IA control. For example, marking 5 indicates that you strongly agree that
RBAC in column B fits under ECLP from column A and the verbiage should be added to the definition of the DoD IA control.
Marking 1 would indicate that you strongly disagree that RBAC fits into ECLP; therefore it should not be incorporated.

Access Control
6.3.2.1. Role Based Access Control (RBAC):

1

2

3

4

Additional Comments:

Q-1
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5

RBAC can be used to provide a uniform means to manage access to
ICS devices while reducing the cost of maintaining individual device
access levels and minimizing errors. RBAC should be used to restrict
ICS user privileges to only those that are required to perform each
person’s job (i.e., configuring each role based on the principle of least
privilege).

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Enclave Boundary Defense (EB)

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: EBRP

Remote Access for Privilege Functions (RP):
Remote access for privileged functions is discouraged, is
permitted only for compelling operational needs, and is
strictly controlled. In addition to EBRU-1, sessions
employ security measures such as a VPN with blocking
mode enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the log
for every remote session.
1

2

3

4

Additional Comments:

Q-2
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5

B. ICS IA
Access Control
6.3.2.4. Dial-up Modem.
- Consider using callback systems when dial-up modems are installed
in an ICS. This ensures that a dialer is an authorized user by having the
modem establish the working connection based on the dialer’s
information from a callback number stored in the ICS approved
authorized user list.
- Ensure that default passwords have been changed and strong
passwords are in place for each modem.
- Physically identify modems in use to the control room operators.
- Configure remote control software to use unique user names and
passwords, strong authentication, encryption if determined appropriate,
and audit logs. Use of this software by remote users should be
monitored on an almost real-time frequency.
- If feasible, disconnect modems when not in use or consider
automating this disconnection process by having modems disconnect
after being on for a given amount of time. It should be noted that
sometimes modem connections are part of the legal support service
agreement with the vendor (e.g., 24x7 support with 15 minute response
time). Personnel should be aware that disconnecting/removing the
modems may require that contracts be renegotiated.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Enclave Boundary Defense (EB)

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: EBRP

Remote Access for Privilege Functions (RP):
Remote access for privileged functions is discouraged, is
permitted only for compelling operational needs, and is
strictly controlled. In addition to EBRU-1, sessions
employ security measures such as a VPN with blocking
mode enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the log
for every remote session.

B. ICS IA
Access Control
6.3.2.2. Web Servers.

1

2

3

4

Additional Comments:

Q-3
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5

SCADA and historian software vendors typically provide
Web servers as a product option so that users outside the
control room can access ICS information. In many cases,
software components such as ActiveX controls or Java
applets must be installed or downloaded onto each client
machine accessing the Web server. Some products, such as
PLCs and other control devices, are available with
embedded Web, FTP, and e-mail servers to make them
easier to configure remotely and allow them to generate email notifications and reports when certain conditions
occur. When feasible, use HTTPS rather than HTTP, use
SFTP or SCP rather than FTP, block inbound FTP and email traffic, etc.

Part B

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Physical and Environment (PE)

Neutral

A. DoD IA Control: PETS

Strongly
Disagree
Disagree

Instructions: This part contains five ICS IA that didn’t translate into an existing DoD IA control; additional interpretation is required in order to
recommend a “new subcategory area” that will adequately address the ICS security concern. Do you agree that the ICS security topic in column B
should fit under newly created DoD IA control in column A? Using a 5-point scale, indicate your level of agreement with creating new DoD IA control
to encompass ICS security topic from column B. For example, marking 5 indicates that you strongly agree that Environmental Control Systems in
column B fits under PETS from column A. Marking 1 would indicate that you strongly disagree Environmental Control Systems fits into PETS;
therefore it should not be incorporated.

[New DoD Subcategory]

Toxic Substance Controls (TS):
1

2

3

4

No current definition available///

Additional Comments:

Q-4
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5

B. ICS IA
Physical and Environmental Protection
Environmental Control Systems.
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems for control
rooms must support plant personnel during normal operation and
emergency situations, which could include the release of toxic
substances. Fire systems must be carefully designed to avoid causing
more harm than good (e.g., to avoid mixing water with incompatible
products). HVAC and fire systems have significantly increased roles in
security that arise from the interdependence of process control and
security. For example, fire prevention and HVAC systems that support
industrial control computers need to be protected against cyber
incidents.

B. ICS IA
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Physical and Environment (PE)

Strongly
Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: PEBP

[New DoD Subcategory]
Blast Protection Controls (BP):

///No current definition available///

1

2

3

4

5

Additional Comments:

Q-5
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Physical and Environmental Protection
Control Center/Control Room.
Providing physical security for the control center/control room is
essential to reduce the potential of many threats. In extreme cases, it
may be considered necessary to make the control center/control room
blast-proof, or to provide an offsite emergency control center/control
room so that control can be maintained if the primary control
center/control room becomes uninhabitable.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Physical and Environment (PE)

Strongly
Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: PEAD

[New DoD Subcategory]

Access Controls to ICS Devices (AD):
1

2

3

4

///No current definition available///

Additional Comments:

Q-6
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5

B. ICS IA
Physical and Environmental Protection
Portable Devices.
Computers and computerized devices used for ICS functions (such as
PLC programming) should never be allowed to leave the ICS area.
Laptops, portable engineering workstations and handhelds (e.g., 375
HART communicator) should be tightly secured and should never be
allowed to be used outside the ICS network. Antivirus and patch
management should be kept current.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Physical and Environment (PE)

Strongly
Disagree

A. DoD IA Control: PETP

[New DoD Subcategory]

Transmission Medium Protection (TP):

1

2

3

4

///No current definition available///

Additional Comments:

Q-7
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5

B. ICS IA
Physical and Environmental Protection
Cabling.
Cabling design and implementation for the control network should be
addressed in the cyber security plan. Unshielded twisted pair
communications cable, while acceptable for the office environment, is
generally not suitable for the plant environment due to its susceptibility
to interference from magnetic fields, radio waves, temperature
extremes, moisture, dust, and vibration. Industrial RJ-45 connectors
should be used in place of other types of twisted pair connectors to
provide protection against moisture, dust and vibration. Fiber-optic
cable and coaxial cable are often better network cabling choices for the
control network because they are immune to many of the typical
environmental conditions including electrical and radio frequency
interference found in an industrial control environment. Cable and
connectors should be color-coded and labeled so that the ICS and IT
networks are clearly delineated and the potential for an inadvertent
cross-connect is reduced. Cable runs should be installed so that access
is minimized (i.e., limited to authorized personnel only) and equipment
should be installed in locked cabinets with adequate ventilation and air
filtration.

A. DoD IA Control: DCVP

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Security Design and Configuration (DC)

B. ICS IA

[New DoD Subcategory]

Virtual Partitioning (VP):

Access Control

Virtual LAN (VLAN).
VLANs have been effectively deployed in ICS networks, with
each automation cell assigned to a single VLAN to limit
unnecessary traffic flooding and allow network devices on the
same VLAN to span multiple switches.
1

2

3

4

5

///No current definition available///

Additional Comments:

Q-8
Thank you for your participation in this Delphi study. I you need assistance completing the survey responses you can
contact Capt Mendezllovet at (813)335-9034 or Mr. Lopez at (937)255-6565 at extension 4637. Please submit your completed
responses via email to eddie.mendezllovet@afit.edu located at the Air Force Institute of Technology in Wright Patterson AFB,
Ohio.
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March 1, 2010

Lt Col Humphries,
I have reviewed your study entitled “Information Assurance Controls for DoD Industrial Control Systems”
and found that your study qualifies for an IRB exemption.
Per 32 CFR 219.101 (b)(2), Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic,
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified,
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’
responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or
be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation is exempt.
Your study qualifies for this exemption because the demographic data you are collecting cannot
realistically be expected to map a given response to a specific subject, and the questions you are asking
could not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’
financial standing, employability, or reputation. Finally, while you are collecting names, this is a required
and natural consequence of your selected data collection methodology. These names will be protected at
all times, only be known to the researchers, and managed according to the AFIT interview protocol.
This determination pertains only to the Federal, DoD, and Air Force regulations that govern the use of
human subjects in research. It does not constitute final approval to conduct the study which should be
granted by you research advisor. Further, if a subject’s future response reasonably places them at risk of
criminal or civil liability or is damaging to their financial standing, employability, or reputation, you are
required to file an adverse event report with this office immediately.
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